Since the end of Jeremy Corbyn’s tenure as its leader, the British Labor party has sought to take a firm stand against the anti-Semitism that had overtaken its ranks in recent years. To succeed in this effort, argues David Hirsh, the party must cease to tolerate Jewish Voice for Labor, a pro-Corbyn and anti-Israel group that has persistently used its members’ identity as Jews to provide cover for anti-Semites. Hirsh writes:

Anti-Zionist Jews are not the useful idiots of left-wing anti-Semitism, they are among its pioneers. They . . . taught Jeremy Corbyn that Zionism was racism and they taught the University and College Union that Israelis should be excluded from UK campuses and journals. They arm contemporary anti-Semitism with little particles of fact and with plausible arguments, dressed up as legitimate Jewish opinion.

Anti-Semitism is frightening because it is irrational. Some Jews are tempted to believe that they live in a world where anti-Semitism is a rational response to the bad behavior of Jews. It is tempting because then Jews could make things better by being good. Sometimes taking on anti-Semitic logic saves Jews from the fear of living in an [irrational] world. Jewish anti-Zionism is one way of dealing the stress of living in an anti-Semitic world. It is understandable as such, but it makes things worse, not better.

Viewed in this frame, the organization Jewish Voice for Labor serves to kosherize Jeremy Corbyn’s anti-Semitic politics and to smear any who say they have experienced anti-Semitism in the party. That is its function; that is why it exists. It is there to pretend that Labor Jews are split on the question of anti-Semitism.

Ron Ben-Yishai, reporting from a visit to IDF forces in the Gaza Strip, analyzes the state of the fighting, and “the persistent challenge of eradicating an entrenched enemy in a complex urban terrain.”

Hamas, sensing the war’s end, is mounting a final effort to inflict casualties. The IDF now controls 65 percent of Gaza’s territory operationally, with observation, fire dominance, and relative freedom of movement, alongside systematic tunnel destruction. . . . Major P, a reserve company commander, says, “It’s frustrating to hear at home that we’re stagnating. The public doesn’t get that if we stop, Hamas will recover.”

Senior IDF officers cite two reasons for the slow progress: meticulous care to protect hostages, requiring cautious movement and constant intelligence gathering, and avoiding heavy losses, with 22 soldiers killed since June.

Two-and-a-half of Hamas’s five brigades have been dismantled, yet a new hostage deal and IDF withdrawal could allow Hamas to regroup. . . . Hamas is at its lowest military and governing point since its founding, reduced to a fragmented guerrilla force. Yet, without complete disarmament and infrastructure destruction, it could resurge as a threat in years.

At the same time, Ben-Yishai observes, not everything hangs on the IDF:

According to the Southern Command chief Major General Yaron Finkelman, the IDF is close to completing its objectives. In classical military terms, “defeat” means the enemy surrenders—but with a jihadist organization, the benchmark is its ability to operate against Israel.

Despite [the IDF’s] battlefield successes, the broader strategic outcome—especially regarding the hostages—now hinges on decisions from the political leadership. “We’ve done our part,” said a senior officer. “We’ve reached a crossroads where the government must decide where it wants to go—both on the hostage issue and on Gaza’s future.”