For decades, writes Tony Badran, U.S. policy in Lebanon has focused on strengthening the country’s institutions—both civilian and military—so that they can serve as a bulwark against Hizballah and other terrorist groups. The rare exception was when Barack Obama was in the White House, as he recognized the truth that Lebanon lay squarely in Iran’s sphere of influence, albeit with a troubling willingness to accept that state of affairs. Badran writes:
Lebanon is not a U.S. ally. It is, rather, an Iranian satrapy under the control of Hizballah, the local arm of [Iran’s] Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Hizballah uses the country as a base for worldwide military and terrorist operations and for training other Iran-backed militias, not to mention as a center for money laundering and illicit finance. Contrary to the traditional conception, Hizballah is not exploiting a safe haven or ungoverned spaces. Instead, it has established itself as the dominant political actor in the country. Hizballah is the state.
Recognizing Iran’s position in Lebanon, the Trump administration resolved to treat the country as an arena of competition with Iran. While the impulse was laudable, the concept was flawed. The idea of competing with Iran disregards Beirut’s reality and treats it as a “winnable” prize—provided America makes the right investment in the Lebanese political order. As a result, “competition with Iran” drags us into increased investment, financial and political, in “state institutions,” which Americans then convince themselves will, sometime in the indeterminate future, counterbalance Hizballah.
This approach misses the most elementary fact of Lebanese politics. What we refer to as “state institutions” are merely the extension of sectarian power dynamics between the leaders of the country’s main sects.
The policy of “competing” with Iran in Lebanon turns the United States into a player in the local political game that is rigged against it. Instead, the United States should treat Lebanon as a theater in which to target Iranian interests. Punitive measures should be designed to do just that: to punish Hizballah and its allies. They should not be regarded as one part of some larger effort at political engineering in Lebanon.
Read more on Caravan: https://www.hoover.org/research/does-us-need-lebanon-policy