While the Islamic Republic last week captured a South Korean oil tanker, and announced that it has begun producing weapons-grade uranium, it has let the anniversary of the death of the generalissimo and terrorist mastermind Qassem Suleimani go by without any acts of revenge—despite threats of major military action. Yossi Kuperwasser sees this behavior as a sign that the ayatollahs are trying to pressure President-elect Joe Biden into reentering the 2015 nuclear deal, but afraid of doing anything to provoke an American response:

In light of [the past two years of intense U.S.] economic pressure, the Iranian situation is entirely different from the image its leaders are trying to project. The new Iranian measures reflect distress. The economic pressure and regional developments—the Abraham Accords and the reconciliation between Qatar and Saudi Arabia—worry Tehran.

For now, Iran will be happy to take [a] safe bet on the way to a toothless nuclear agreement that will give them not only one nuclear bomb but a large arsenal of nuclear weapons in a decade—without suffering militarily or economically. The declared willingness of Iran to return to the agreement testifies to its preferences.

The appropriate response to the Iranian move is to make clear that any attempt to move towards acquiring of enough enriched uranium for the production of nuclear weapons will be met harshly, and in this context, “all options are on the table.” At the same time, the economic pressure must continue in order to compel Iran to accept a new agreement that would scrupulously prevent any possibility of its stockpiling nuclear weapons, which includes full oversight everywhere and at all times, the lifting of restrictions on the duration of the agreement, the demolition of the enrichment facility in Fordow, and the inclusion of [restrictions on] ballistic missiles in the deal.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.