On Tuesday, Qatar and Saudi Arabia agreed to end their long-simmering dispute, which came to a head when Riyadh imposed a blockade on the peninsular emirate in 2017. The conflict pitted the Saudis—along with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt—against Qatar, and has had major consequences for the region. Benny Avni comments:

The Saudis and their partners accused Doha of cooperating with Iran. Egypt was concerned about Qatar’s support of its top enemy at home, the Muslim Brotherhood. Every [government] in the Arab world was angry at Qatar’s [anti-Semitic and anti-American news outlet] Al Jazeera. That most influential Arabic-language medium stirred up anti-authoritarian feelings across the region, where public unrest threatens regimes and heightens instability.

[T]the Gulf states are American allies. The Saudis and Emiratis, which recently acquired major American arms systems, battle Iran and their own extreme Islamist political forces. Qatar hosts the largest American military base in the region. The Gulf dispute, [therefore], was a major headache for America. Banned from Saudi air space, the Qataris flew over Iran, allowing Tehran to collect a fee and harming President Trump’s drive to isolate the Islamic Republic economically. Doha, meanwhile, allied with Turkey in backing the Muslim Brotherhood.

For Qatar, winding down its Muslim Brotherhood ties is unlikely. That could remain a source of . . . discord. The Qataris, adept at playing all sides against the middle, will try to leverage these ties to offer diplomatic mediation between Washington and anti-American Islamists.

Why are the two sides ending their dispute now?

The answer is Iran. The Sunni Gulf Cooperation Council members fear the renewal of President Obama’s call on them to learn how to “share” the region with Shiite (and, more importantly, meddlesome, belligerent, dangerous, and anti-American) Iran. When Tehran was in America’s crosshairs, they could afford indulging in petty disputes. No longer.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.