As the Biden administration considers how it can revive the 2015 agreement to restrain the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program, those who favor such a move will no doubt argue that Washington can use its position to bolster the “moderates” in Tehran while undermining the “hardliners” who oppose any sort of deal-making. With Iran planning a presidential election in June, the reasoning goes, a conciliatory American stance would help ensure the victory of a moderate. Such a strategy, however, is based on a fantastical view of the Iranian political system, as Jason M. Brodsky explains:

Would-be negotiators in Washington should recognize that whatever the goals of a Biden-led deal might be, empowering moderates is unlikely to succeed. The regime has already seen to it that they are sidelined in the most sensitive state organs.

The United States must understand the limitations of its power in trying to influence a system that is built on anti-Americanism. The ideological successors of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei are entrenched. Rushing to rejoin the [nuclear deal] before Iran’s next presidential election won’t change that dynamic, as it’s the supreme leader and not the president who has the final word on foreign-policy decision-making. The mythical moderates just don’t occupy the positions that matter.

Analyzing the recent direct Iranian attack on Israel, and Israel’s security situation more generally, Michael Oren looks to the 2015 agreement to restrain Iran’s nuclear program. That, and President Biden’s efforts to resurrect the deal after Donald Trump left it, are in his view the source of the current crisis:

Of the original motivations for the deal—blocking Iran’s path to the bomb and transforming Iran into a peaceful nation—neither remained. All Biden was left with was the ability to kick the can down the road and to uphold Barack Obama’s singular foreign-policy achievement.

In order to achieve that result, the administration has repeatedly refused to punish Iran for its malign actions:

Historians will survey this inexplicable record and wonder how the United States not only allowed Iran repeatedly to assault its citizens, soldiers, and allies but consistently rewarded it for doing so. They may well conclude that in a desperate effort to avoid getting dragged into a regional Middle Eastern war, the U.S. might well have precipitated one.

While America’s friends in the Middle East, especially Israel, have every reason to feel grateful for the vital assistance they received in intercepting Iran’s missile and drone onslaught, they might also ask what the U.S. can now do differently to deter Iran from further aggression. . . . Tehran will see this weekend’s direct attack on Israel as a victory—their own—for their ability to continue threatening Israel and destabilizing the Middle East with impunity.

Israel, of course, must respond differently. Our target cannot simply be the Iranian proxies that surround our country and that have waged war on us since October 7, but, as the Saudis call it, “the head of the snake.”