Earlier this month the Lebanese publisher, activist, and journalist Lokman Slim was shot dead. Slim played a leading role in the 2019 protests against Hizballah, and had most recently been involved in investigating the terrorist group’s culpability in the Beirut port explosion last year. Hanin Ghaddar comments:

Slim was threatened directly and repeatedly by Hizballah, and he himself wrote a statement last year holding the party responsible for any action that would harm him or his family. He was assassinated in the south of Lebanon—a Hizballah stronghold—a mile away from a UN compound. Most importantly, he was killed in a way that would send a clear message to other activists and to the international community. If Hizballah’s leaders only wanted to get rid of Slim, they could have easily made [his death] look like a car accident or a robbery, and thereby avoid the blame, but they wanted to send a message to others while testing the limits of the international community.

To protect those who are still fighting the fight in Lebanon, and make sure Slim’s achievements and breakthroughs within the Shiite community do not go to waste, the international community must draw very clear red lines. Compromises should not be made when Hizballah’s weapons are pointed at the Lebanese people, and Washington should coordinate with Paris closely to make sure Emmanuel Macron’s upcoming visit to Lebanon offers stronger protection to activists and no compromises with the political class and its corrupt enablers.

Anti-corruption and terrorism sanctions should not stop, but rather pick up pace and target a wider range of corrupt political figures from all sects and parties. Hizballah’s leaders only understand clear and firm actions. Slim was clear and firm, and it frightened them. Now is not the time to backpedal.

Concluded in 1979, the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty ended nearly 30 years of intermittent warfare, and proved one of the most enduring and beneficial products of Middle East diplomacy. But Egypt may not have been upholding its end of the bargain, write Jonathan Schanzer and Mariam Wahba:

Article III, subsection two of the peace agreement’s preamble explicitly requires both parties “to ensure that that acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, or violence do not originate from and are not committed from within its territory.” This clause also mandates both parties to hold accountable any perpetrators of such acts.

Recent Israeli operations along the Philadelphi Corridor, the narrow strip of land bordering Egypt and Gaza, have uncovered multiple tunnels and access points used by Hamas—some in plain sight of Egyptian guard towers. While it could be argued that Egypt has lacked the capacity to tackle this problem, it is equally plausible that it lacks the will. Either way, it’s a serious problem.

Was Egypt motivated by money, amidst a steep and protracted economic decline in recent years? Did Cairo get paid off by Hamas, or its wealthy patron, Qatar? Did the Iranians play a role? Was Egypt threatened with violence and unrest by the Sinai’s Bedouin Union of Tribes, who are the primary profiteers of smuggling, if it did not allow the tunnels to operate? Or did the Sisi regime take part in this operation because of an ideological hatred of Israel?