The U.S., and France, Must Respond to Hizballah’s Murder of One of Its Foremost Critics

Feb. 18 2021

Earlier this month the Lebanese publisher, activist, and journalist Lokman Slim was shot dead. Slim played a leading role in the 2019 protests against Hizballah, and had most recently been involved in investigating the terrorist group’s culpability in the Beirut port explosion last year. Hanin Ghaddar comments:

Slim was threatened directly and repeatedly by Hizballah, and he himself wrote a statement last year holding the party responsible for any action that would harm him or his family. He was assassinated in the south of Lebanon—a Hizballah stronghold—a mile away from a UN compound. Most importantly, he was killed in a way that would send a clear message to other activists and to the international community. If Hizballah’s leaders only wanted to get rid of Slim, they could have easily made [his death] look like a car accident or a robbery, and thereby avoid the blame, but they wanted to send a message to others while testing the limits of the international community.

To protect those who are still fighting the fight in Lebanon, and make sure Slim’s achievements and breakthroughs within the Shiite community do not go to waste, the international community must draw very clear red lines. Compromises should not be made when Hizballah’s weapons are pointed at the Lebanese people, and Washington should coordinate with Paris closely to make sure Emmanuel Macron’s upcoming visit to Lebanon offers stronger protection to activists and no compromises with the political class and its corrupt enablers.

Anti-corruption and terrorism sanctions should not stop, but rather pick up pace and target a wider range of corrupt political figures from all sects and parties. Hizballah’s leaders only understand clear and firm actions. Slim was clear and firm, and it frightened them. Now is not the time to backpedal.

Read more at Foreign Policy

More about: Emmanuel Macron, Hizballah, Iran, U.S. Foreign policy

Israel Must Act Swiftly to Defeat Hamas

On Monday night, the IDF struck a group of Hamas operatives near the Nasser hospital in Khan Yunis, the main city in southern Gaza. The very fact of this attack was reassuring, as it suggested that the release of Edan Alexander didn’t come with restraints on Israeli military activity. Then, yesterday afternoon, Israeli jets carried out another, larger attack on Khan Yunis, hitting a site where it believed Mohammad Sinwar, the head of Hamas in Gaza, to be hiding. The IDF has not yet confirmed that he was present. There is some hope that the death of Sinwar—who replaced his older brother Yahya after he was killed last year—could have a debilitating effect on Hamas.

Meanwhile, Donald Trump is visiting the Persian Gulf, and it’s unclear how his diplomatic efforts there will affect Israel, its war with Hamas, and Iran. For its part, Jerusalem has committed to resume full-scale operations in Gaza after President Trump returns to the U.S. But, Gabi Simoni and Erez Winner explain, Israel does not have unlimited time to defeat Hamas:

Israel faces persistent security challenges across multiple fronts—Iran, the West Bank, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon—all demanding significant military resources, especially during periods of escalation. . . . Failing to achieve a decisive victory not only prolongs the conflict but also drains national resources and threatens Israel’s ability to obtain its strategic goals.

Only a swift, forceful military campaign can achieve the war’s objectives: securing the hostages’ release, ensuring Israeli citizens’ safety, and preventing future kidnappings. Avoiding such action won’t just prolong the suffering of the hostages and deepen public uncertainty—it will also drain national resources and weaken Israel’s standing in the region and beyond.

We recommend launching an intense military operation in Gaza without delay, with clear, measurable objectives—crippling Hamas’s military and governance capabilities and securing the release of hostages. Such a campaign should combine military pressure with indirect negotiations, maximizing the chances of a successful outcome while minimizing risks.

Crucially, the operation must be closely coordinated with the United States and moderate Arab states to reduce international pressure and preserve the gains of regional alliances.

Read more at Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, Israeli strategy