While the White House has made clear its desire to reenter some form of the 2015 agreement to restrict the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program, there are multiple obstacles to doing so—most importantly Tehran’s own behavior. Another is the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA) passed shortly before the deal was concluded, which gives Congress oversight over any “agreement related to the nuclear program of Iran, . . . regardless of the form it takes.” Stephen Rademaker explains its present implications:

If the Biden administration agrees with Iran on a pathway for returning to the nuclear deal, INARA will require that agreement to be submitted for congressional review, with the prospect of votes in both congressional chambers on whether to reject the agreement. Unless the administration is prepared to defy the statute, its only alternative for avoiding congressional review of its policy will be to lift sanctions unilaterally and to trust Iran to reciprocate by coming back into full compliance itself.

Even if the Biden administration manages to finesse this aspect of the law, it will not be free of INARA. The act further requires the president to submit a compliance certification to Congress every 90 days confirming that, among other things, “Iran is transparently, verifiably, and fully implementing the agreement.” President Trump stopped submitting these certifications when he withdrew from the agreement, but if President Biden rejoins the Iran deal, INARA will require him to resume submitting them.

Given how hard it will be for Iran to return to full compliance, it’s not clear how Biden will be able to make this certification initially, even if Iran tries diligently to comply. And if Tehran doesn’t try to comply fully, Biden certainly won’t be able to make the certification. [Thus the] administration will likely find it challenging indeed to develop a post-Trump strategy toward Iran that can pass muster with both Tehran and the U.S. Congress.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.