While the White House has made clear its desire to reenter some form of the 2015 agreement to restrict the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program, there are multiple obstacles to doing so—most importantly Tehran’s own behavior. Another is the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA) passed shortly before the deal was concluded, which gives Congress oversight over any “agreement related to the nuclear program of Iran, . . . regardless of the form it takes.” Stephen Rademaker explains its present implications:
If the Biden administration agrees with Iran on a pathway for returning to the nuclear deal, INARA will require that agreement to be submitted for congressional review, with the prospect of votes in both congressional chambers on whether to reject the agreement. Unless the administration is prepared to defy the statute, its only alternative for avoiding congressional review of its policy will be to lift sanctions unilaterally and to trust Iran to reciprocate by coming back into full compliance itself.
Even if the Biden administration manages to finesse this aspect of the law, it will not be free of INARA. The act further requires the president to submit a compliance certification to Congress every 90 days confirming that, among other things, “Iran is transparently, verifiably, and fully implementing the agreement.” President Trump stopped submitting these certifications when he withdrew from the agreement, but if President Biden rejoins the Iran deal, INARA will require him to resume submitting them.
Given how hard it will be for Iran to return to full compliance, it’s not clear how Biden will be able to make this certification initially, even if Iran tries diligently to comply. And if Tehran doesn’t try to comply fully, Biden certainly won’t be able to make the certification. [Thus the] administration will likely find it challenging indeed to develop a post-Trump strategy toward Iran that can pass muster with both Tehran and the U.S. Congress.
Read more on RealClear World: https://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2021/03/01/why_a_return_to_the_jcpoa_will_be_even_harder_than_many_think_731930.html