In 2013, Beijing formally announced its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), an effort to create a network of railroads, ports, and other infrastructure spanning across Asia to Europe, facilitating trade and expanding Chinese influence. This project has included closer economic ties with Iran and the Gulf states, as well as with Turkey and the Levant. While China’s steps to expand the Belt and Road into Israel have become liabilities for the Jewish state, the Communist country is actively gaining a foothold Syria, Lebanon, and Turkey. Mordechai Chaziza and Efraim Karsh write:

China has evolved from simply an oil and gas consumer into a major economic (and to a lesser extent political) player in the Middle East. China is now the Middle East’s largest foreign investor, with its $155 billion worth of investment from 2013 to 2020 accounting for over 40 percent of the total direct foreign investment in the region during this period.

One of the main beneficiaries of this development has been the Levant, which had previously occupied a marginal place in Beijing’s energy-oriented regional involvement. Investment in Israel, to give a prominent example, has nearly doubled from $6 billion in 2005-13 to $10 billion in 2013-19. But Syria, Lebanon, and Turkey, which lack Israel’s economic and technological prowess, have also benefitted from the BRI as their location at a critical segment of the new Eurasian overland and maritime routes enabled them to integrate into China’s global economic surge, not unlike their role in the historic Silk Road.

Keenly aware of its highly limited ability to influence the military course of the war [in Syria], China allowed Russia to take the leading role in securing the survival of the Assad regime while contenting itself with extending political support to Damascus, mainly at the UN Security Council where it helped block anti-Syrian measures. . . . Beijing’s military support for the Assad regime was limited to the sale of reconnaissance drones and the deployment of a special-operations force in late 2017 to fight the reported 5,000 Chinese Uighurs who were fighting in Syria.

[A]nnual Chinese-Turkish trade, which crossed the $1 billion threshold in 2000, had grown tenfold by 2009, and the following year, Beijing and Ankara launched a “strategic cooperative relationship.” . . . No less important, to the exasperation of its NATO partners, in 2013 Turkey chose the Chinese HQ-9 air-defense missile system over the European SAMP/T and the U.S. Patriot.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.