While Ethiopia is engaged in bloody internecine fighting in its Tigray region, and Sudan is in the midst of a significant political transition, plans for the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam—constructed athwart the Blue Nile, which flows into Sudan and there joins the waters of the White Nile and continues on to Egypt—continue apace. Since work on the dam began in 2011, it has been the subject of tension between Addis Ababa and Cairo, the latter fearing its potential effects on the Nile’s waters in Egypt. Both Egypt and Ethiopia have longstanding friendly relations with Israel, while Sudan only recently signed a peace treaty with the Jewish state. Alberto M. Fernandez examines the implications for the Middle East:

The [dam] should, in normal rainy years, bring benefits to all three countries in terms of regularizing waterflow, but in years of drought, Egypt would be at the mercy of a foreign power 2,000 miles away. . . . [T]here is no doubt that the distrust and tension are rising.

[Meanwhile], the military dimension of a possible conflict is closer to the surface than ever before. Parts of the Sudan-Ethiopian border now host not only regular Sudanese and Ethiopian armed forces, but irregular forces and ill-disciplined tribal militias. Sudan’s former Janjaweed, [an Arab militia], face [Ethiopian] Amhara militias known for their brutality against local people. With the chance of inadvertent, escalating clashes and public saber-rattling so prominent, a first step must be to ensure that a dangerous, volatile situation does not deteriorate even further into open military conflict before the rains come.

The rising regional conflict places Sudan’s fragile transition toward democracy and national peace at great risk. . . . Sudan is assaulted by remnants of the Omar al-Bashir regime broadcasting daily anti-government Islamist propaganda in Arabic from Istanbul. (The Erdogan government was very supportive of the brutal Bashir regime in its last years). . . . The UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Israel can all play a role in making the situation better or worse and need to be in constant dialogue with international mediators to ensure they play, at least, a non-negative role.

Considering the current state of Israel-Arab relations, Ghaith al-Omari writes

First and foremost, no ceasefire will be possible without the release of Israeli hostages and commitments to disarm Hamas and remove it from power. The final say on these matters rests with Hamas commanders on the ground in Gaza, who have been largely impervious to foreign pressure so far. At minimum, however, the United States should insist that Qatari and Egyptian mediators push Hamas’s external leadership to accept these conditions publicly, which could increase pressure on the group’s Gaza leadership.

Washington should also demand a clear, public position from key Arab states regarding disarmament. The Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas endorsed this position in a June letter to Saudi Arabia and France, giving Arab states Palestinian cover for endorsing it themselves.

Some Arab states have already indicated a willingness to play a significant role, but they will have little incentive to commit resources and personnel to Gaza unless Israel (1) provides guarantees that it will not occupy the Strip indefinitely, and (2) removes its veto on a PA role in Gaza’s future, even if only symbolic at first. Arab officials are also seeking assurances that any role they play in Gaza will be in the context of a wider effort to reach a two-state solution.

On the other hand, Washington must remain mindful that current conditions between Israel and the Palestinians are not remotely conducive to . . . implementing a two-state solution.