On Saturday, the Chinese foreign minister came to Tehran to sign a major trade and investment agreement. Although the text has not been made public, it purportedly involves Beijing funneling $400 billion into the Islamic Republic over the next 25 years. Elliott Abrams carefully outlines why he believes this figure to be exaggerated, perhaps wildly. Nonetheless, he writes, the deal will have real consequences—and also reveals something about Iran’s current circumstances:

One has to assume that Iran will sell more and more oil to China, defying and undermining U.S. sanctions. And one should also assume that China will increase its investments in Iran, in many sectors of the economy. Among other harmful effects, we should consider how this will affect China’s willingness to discipline Iran in the International Atomic Energy Agency for its continuing violations of the [2015 nuclear deal] and the Non-Proliferation Treaty—violations that bring Iran closer to being able to create a deliverable nuclear weapon.

Finally, one has to wonder about the prospects of Iran selling “heavily discounted” oil to China as its end of the deal, as is suggested in the New York Times report. The regime of the ayatollahs claims that Iran seeks independence and [self-reliance], comparing its firmness on this subject with the supposed weakness of the shah. But suppose this deal with China came true. Then Iran would be selling oil cheaply to China, and China would be buying up the whole country. Remember: the maximum amount ever invested in Iran in one year was $5 billion, and under this supposed deal China alone would be investing three times that amount annually for 25 years. At the end of that period, Iran would be a wholly owned subsidiary of China, basically a gas station for the People’s Republic.

Skepticism about all the numbers is very much in order. And for Iranians, information about what has been agreed should be the key goal. Either the amounts are ridiculous and are mostly propaganda designed to boost both the Chinese and Iranian regimes. Or if the amounts are accurate, the regime, suffering under U.S. sanctions, is selling the country to China.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.