In southern Lebanon, the Iran-backed terrorist group Hizballah has at least 150,000 missiles—on the whole more powerful and sophisticated than those used by Hamas—pointed at Israel, along with well-trained troops prepared to make cross-border raids and defend against any counterattack by the IDF. And that’s not to mention its troops and military installations in Syria, or the network of global criminal enterprises that funds its war-making abilities. The Shiite organization is also vulnerable, however, and Danny Citrinowicz argues that the U.S. and its allies can take advantage of that:

Over the course of the past few years, Hizballah saw its popularity in Lebanon increasingly wane, [especially] following the Beirut blast in August 2020—even among segments of the local Shiite population. Hizballah’s draconian grip on the country’s failing political system has pitted the Lebanese against it. They have rightfully blamed the group for the abysmal state of affairs in the country, including an unprecedented economic crisis.

Hizballah itself is feeling the economic pinch because of effective international sanctions against Iran—the group’s primary financial backer—as well as the fact that the nearly decade-long Syria war drained Iran’s coffers. As a result of financial problems and its diminished credibility, the group is finding it very difficult to maintain its grip on power.

Several countries around the world have already designated Hizballah as a terrorist organization due to its track record of committing acts of terror worldwide. . . . Most measures countries have taken against Hizballah, [however], have been directed at the group’s operations in Lebanon. Internationally, while there are attempts to thwart terrorist attacks, there is very little action taken to combat the group’s illicit and criminal activities.

Therefore, it is important to step up international efforts to combat [these] illicit activities around the world. This is the opportune time to go after the group.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.