Last week, the former Soviet Republic of Belarus briefly captured international attention when it compelled a passenger flight traversing its airspace to land—so that Belarusian police could arrest an expatriate, dissident journalist who was onboard, along with his girlfriend. Aykan Erdemir notes why observers of the Middle East should pay attention:

[Last] Wednesday, NATO issued a statement condemning the “forced diversion” and declared its support for “measures taken by Allies individually and collectively in response to this incident.” According to Reuters, Turkey blocked punitive steps for which Baltic allies and Poland had pressed. Ankara also prevented calls for additional Western sanctions on Belarus and the release of political prisoners there.

This is not the first time that Erdogan has rushed to Lukashenko’s aid. In August 2020, when the European Council called Belarus’s disputed presidential election “neither free nor fair” and refused to recognize the results, Erdogan was one of the first world leaders to congratulate Lukashenko, joining other authoritarian leaders, including Russia’s President Vladimir Putin.

Collusion between Ankara and Moscow to undermine NATO is nothing new. When Turkey signed a missile deal with Russia in 2017, it became the first NATO member to purchase big-ticket military hardware from Moscow. Since then, Turkey also became the first NATO member that the United States has sanctioned [for] significant transactions with the Russian defense or intelligence sectors.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.