Last month, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) released a series of reports on the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program. Oded Brosh, sifting through the technical language of these documents, sees evidence that—despite apparent Israeli efforts at sabotage—the ayatollahs are moving closer to the capability to produce nuclear weapons. He points to some of the most disturbing facts:

The Fordow [nuclear] facility, which is located inside a mountain on a Revolutionary Guard military base, is continuing to produce 20-percent enriched uranium, [which is a low-level of enrichment for bomb-building, but too high for civilian use]. The accumulation of significant stocks of 20-percent enriched uranium is an ominous milestone on Iran’s path to producing highly enriched uranium for weapons.

The Fordow facility is now using prohibited types of centrifuges to engage in prohibited enrichment to prohibited levels. The fact that Fordow was allowed by the [terms of the 2015 nuclear agreement] to continue to exist rather than be closed down and dismantled is telling. It is now clear why Iran insisted on its preservation as an indispensable part of the agreement.

Another disconcerting aspect of the IAEA report is the theme of frustration, and the long list of substantive complaints, about Iran’s increasing undermining of verification, transparency, and access, and its evasiveness at providing the agency with information requested regarding suspect sites. . . . The IAEA’s verification access is so eroded that it is becoming essentially worthless.

Iran is evidently . . . moving forward toward a nuclear weapon relatively swiftly and with determination, and will continue to do so unless other events like the [mysterious explosions in] April slow it down.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.