Among the reasons cited by those arguing in favor of ending U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan is the need to focus foreign-policy efforts on “great-power competition” with Russia and China. Yet the humiliating American collapse in the Central Asian nation works in Moscow’s favor, writes Anna Borshchevskaya:

[I]n 2009, Moscow pressured Kyrgyzstan to close the Manas airbase that the country was leasing to the United States. The American presence in Central Asia worried Moscow at least as much as the threat from the Taliban; Putin did not want American bases in this region, Russia’s historic vulnerable “soft underbelly.” Over the years, Moscow worked to build influence in Afghanistan not simply out of security considerations but also with the aim of weakening the West and NATO.

By at least as late as 2007, Moscow opened a line of communication with the Taliban and engaged the Taliban diplomatically—which in and of itself lent it greater legitimacy. Senior U.S. military and Afghan officials suggested support later went beyond diplomacy, to arms provision. In more recent years, [the Kremlin’s] public diplomatic engagement only intensified. The Taliban is officially considered a terrorist organization in Russia, but since 2018 Moscow has hosted Taliban officials for several rounds of peace talks, which produced little tangible progress but gave Moscow an opportunity to come out as a convener of a major diplomatic initiative where the U.S. did not play a key role. Russian officials also routinely met with the Taliban in Qatar over the years.

Moscow’s current attitude towards Afghanistan remains complex but ultimately highlights [its] anti-American priorities. . . . [A]s desperate Afghans cling to sides of American airplanes leaving Kabul while Biden tells the American public he does not regret his decision, Moscow’s (like Beijing’s) clout can simply grow by default.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.