Among the reasons cited by those arguing in favor of ending U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan is the need to focus foreign-policy efforts on “great-power competition” with Russia and China. Yet the humiliating American collapse in the Central Asian nation works in Moscow’s favor, writes Anna Borshchevskaya:

[I]n 2009, Moscow pressured Kyrgyzstan to close the Manas airbase that the country was leasing to the United States. The American presence in Central Asia worried Moscow at least as much as the threat from the Taliban; Putin did not want American bases in this region, Russia’s historic vulnerable “soft underbelly.” Over the years, Moscow worked to build influence in Afghanistan not simply out of security considerations but also with the aim of weakening the West and NATO.

By at least as late as 2007, Moscow opened a line of communication with the Taliban and engaged the Taliban diplomatically—which in and of itself lent it greater legitimacy. Senior U.S. military and Afghan officials suggested support later went beyond diplomacy, to arms provision. In more recent years, [the Kremlin’s] public diplomatic engagement only intensified. The Taliban is officially considered a terrorist organization in Russia, but since 2018 Moscow has hosted Taliban officials for several rounds of peace talks, which produced little tangible progress but gave Moscow an opportunity to come out as a convener of a major diplomatic initiative where the U.S. did not play a key role. Russian officials also routinely met with the Taliban in Qatar over the years.

Moscow’s current attitude towards Afghanistan remains complex but ultimately highlights [its] anti-American priorities. . . . [A]s desperate Afghans cling to sides of American airplanes leaving Kabul while Biden tells the American public he does not regret his decision, Moscow’s (like Beijing’s) clout can simply grow by default.

Examining the effects of Iran’s decision to launch nearly 200 ballistic missiles at Israel on October 1, Benny Morris takes stock of the Jewish state’s strategic situation:

The massive Iranian attack has turned what began as a local war in and around the Gaza Strip and then expanded into a Hamas–Hizballah–Houthi–Israeli war [into] a regional war with wide and possibly calamitous international repercussions.

Before the Iranians launched their attack, Washington warned Tehran to desist (“don’t,” in President Biden’s phrase), and Israel itself had reportedly cautioned the Iranians secretly that such an attack would trigger a devastating Israeli counterstrike. But a much-humiliated Iran went ahead, nonetheless.

For Israel, the way forward seems to lie in an expansion of the war—in the north or south or both—until the country attains some sort of victory, or a diplomatic settlement is reached. A “victory” would mean forcing Hizballah to cease fire in exchange, say, for a cessation of the IDF bombing campaign and withdrawal to the international border, or forcing Iran, after suffering real pain from IDF attacks, to cease its attacks and rein in its proxies: Hizballah, Hamas, and the Houthis.

At the same time, writes Morris, a victory along such lines would still have its limits:

An IDF withdrawal from southern Lebanon and a cessation of Israeli air-force bombing would result in Hizballah’s resurgence and its re-investment of southern Lebanon down to the border. Neither the Americans nor the French nor the UN nor the Lebanese army—many of whose troops are Shiites who support Hizballah—would fight them.