Among the reasons cited by those arguing in favor of ending U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan is the need to focus foreign-policy efforts on “great-power competition” with Russia and China. Yet the humiliating American collapse in the Central Asian nation works in Moscow’s favor, writes Anna Borshchevskaya:

[I]n 2009, Moscow pressured Kyrgyzstan to close the Manas airbase that the country was leasing to the United States. The American presence in Central Asia worried Moscow at least as much as the threat from the Taliban; Putin did not want American bases in this region, Russia’s historic vulnerable “soft underbelly.” Over the years, Moscow worked to build influence in Afghanistan not simply out of security considerations but also with the aim of weakening the West and NATO.

By at least as late as 2007, Moscow opened a line of communication with the Taliban and engaged the Taliban diplomatically—which in and of itself lent it greater legitimacy. Senior U.S. military and Afghan officials suggested support later went beyond diplomacy, to arms provision. In more recent years, [the Kremlin’s] public diplomatic engagement only intensified. The Taliban is officially considered a terrorist organization in Russia, but since 2018 Moscow has hosted Taliban officials for several rounds of peace talks, which produced little tangible progress but gave Moscow an opportunity to come out as a convener of a major diplomatic initiative where the U.S. did not play a key role. Russian officials also routinely met with the Taliban in Qatar over the years.

Moscow’s current attitude towards Afghanistan remains complex but ultimately highlights [its] anti-American priorities. . . . [A]s desperate Afghans cling to sides of American airplanes leaving Kabul while Biden tells the American public he does not regret his decision, Moscow’s (like Beijing’s) clout can simply grow by default.

Steve Witkoff, the American special envoy leading negotiations with the Islamic Republic, has sent mixed signals about his intentions, some of them recently contradicted by Secretary of State Marco Rubio. Michael Doran looks at the progress of the talks so far, and explains why he fears that they could result in an even worse version of the 2015 deal, known formally as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA):

This new deal will preserve Iran’s latent nuclear weapons capabilities—centrifuges, scientific expertise, and unmonitored sites—that will facilitate a simple reconstitution in the future. These capabilities are far more potent today than they were in 2015, with Iran’s advances making them easier to reactivate, a significant step back from the JCPOA’s constraints.

In return, President Trump would offer sanctions relief, delivering countless billions of dollars to Iranian coffers. Iran, in the meantime, will benefit from the permanent erasure of JCPOA snapback sanctions, set to expire in October 2025, reducing U.S. leverage further. Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps will use the revenues to support its regional proxies, such as Hizballah, Hamas, and the Houthis, whom it will arm with missiles and drones that will not be restricted by the deal.

Worse still, Israel will not be able to take action to stop Iran from producing nuclear weapons:

A unilateral military strike . . . is unlikely without Trump’s backing, as Israel needs U.S. aircraft and missile defenses to counter Iran’s retaliation with drones, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles—a counterattack Israel cannot fend off alone.

By defanging Iran’s proxies and destroying its defenses, Israel stripped Tehran naked, creating a historic opportunity to end forever the threat of its nuclear weapons program. But Tehran’s weakness also convinced it to enter the kind of negotiations at which it excels. Israel’s battlefield victories, therefore, facilitated a deal that will place Iran’s nuclear program under an undeclared but very real American protective shield.