Last week, a British court reversed a government decision to strip a woman of her citizenship on the grounds that she had joined Islamic State (IS). The decision throws into question one of London’s main strategies for dealing with those who have joined the terrorist group. Charlie Peters writes:

Those [Britons who went to Syria and Iraq to join IS and then] slipped through the net and made it back home have faced mandatory deradicalization programs, or—in the most extreme cases—constant surveillance. But this costly, ineffective strategy has prioritized the rights and freedoms of returning jihadists over the safety of innocent people. And the approach is now likely to face another test, as the 425 or so IS fighters and spouses who have returned are expected to be joined by their former twisted comrades, who have had their hopes of freedom in Britain bolstered by [the] recent high court ruling.

Optimism is certainly growing among those who have found themselves in limbo in detention camps after the collapse of IS. After their passports were canceled by Western governments, many of these former fighters have promoted the idea that they have repented their views and are ready to return to a peaceful life back home.

The testimony of soldier-turned-filmmaker Alan Duncan, who has released a documentary, What About Justice For Us?, calls into question the wisdom of allowing [these] Westerners to come home. Duncan spoke to a Norwegian IS spouse, who smirked while claiming that Yazidi women “weren’t sex slaves, they are slaves that you are allowed to have sex with.’” She also claimed that Islamic State brides had returned to smoking and other practices they dropped when they joined the terror group so that Westerners would not be suspicious of them.

Duncan [also] said he met a British-Bangladeshi woman in the al-Hol [detention camp in Syria] who stopped him as he was leaving the Western section. She told him that she believed in the caliphate, but in the meantime she was going to return to Britain and prepare for the next steps.

In 2003, the Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi, spooked by the American display of might in Iraq, decided to destroy or surrender his entire nuclear program. Informed observers have suggested that the deal he made with the U.S. should serve as a model for any agreement with Iran. Robert Joseph provides some useful background:

Gaddafi had convinced himself that Libya would be next on the U.S. target list after Iraq. There was no reason or need to threaten Libya with bombing as Gaddafi was quick to tell almost every visitor that he did not want to be Saddam Hussein. The images of Saddam being pulled from his spider hole . . . played on his mind.

President Bush’s goal was to have Libya serve as an alternative model to Iraq. Instead of war, proliferators would give up their nuclear programs in exchange for relief from economic and political sanctions.

Any outcome that permits Iran to enrich uranium at any level will fail the one standard that President Trump has established: Iran will not be allowed to have a nuclear weapon. Limiting enrichment even to low levels will allow Iran to break out of the agreement at any time, no matter what the agreement says.

Iran is not a normal government that observes the rules of international behavior or fair “dealmaking.” This is a regime that relies on regional terror and brutal repression of its citizens to stay in power. It has a long history of using negotiations to expand its nuclear program. Its negotiating tactics are clear: extend the negotiations as long as possible and meet any concession with more demands.