Last Thursday, the Islamic Republic swore in its new president, Ebrahim Raisi, a veteran leader who has presided over some of the regime’s most murderous acts of oppression. Yet neither Raisi’s record nor his country’s most recent acts of piracy, kidnapping, and war-making deterred the EU from sending a delegate to the ceremony. Fiamma Nirenstein observes:

First in line at the party—and seated in the front row at the ceremony—were the Hamas politburo chief Ismail Haniyeh, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad leader Ziad al-Nakhaleh, and the Hizballah deputy secretary-general Naim Qassem (whose Lebanon-based, Iran-backed organization had just fired a barrage of missiles at Israel). . . . In the row right behind them, wearing a red tie, sat Enrique Mora, deputy secretary-general of the European External Action Service, the European Union’s diplomatic body, who officially added the above organizations to the EU blacklist—and who’s been leading Europe in the talks in Vienna to breathe new life into the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the nuclear deal with Iran.

[H]ow can Europe pay homage to a country that has made the destruction of the Jewish state and hatred of America its principal banner? How can it celebrate a government that invites and honors those who plan the murder of women and children on buses and pizzerias and supplies them with money?

The ayatollahs can be pleased with themselves. While terrorists take their place prominently in the first row, we in Europe, without a word, situate ourselves behind them in the second row.

Noah Rothman provides a worthwhile reminder of why a nuclear Iran is a threat not just to Israel, but to the United States:

For one, Iran is the foremost state sponsor of terrorism on earth. It exports terrorists and arms throughout the region and beyond, and there are no guarantees that it won’t play a similarly reckless game with nuclear material. At minimum, the terrorist elements in Iran’s orbit would be emboldened by Iran’s new nuclear might. Their numbers would surely grow, as would their willingness to court risk.

Iran maintains the largest arsenal of ballistic missiles in the region. It can certainly deliver a warhead to targets inside the Middle East, and it’s fast-tracking the development of space-launch vehicles that can threaten the U.S. mainland. Even if Tehran were a rational actor that could be reliably deterred, an acknowledged Iranian bomb would kick-start a race toward nuclear proliferation in the region. The Saudis, the Turks, the Egyptians, and others would probably be compelled to seek their own nuclear deterrents, leading to an infinitely more complex security environment.

In the meantime, Iran would be able to blackmail the West, allowing it occasionally to choke off the trade and energy exports that transit the Persian Gulf and to engage in far more reckless acts of international terrorism.

As for the possible consequences, Rothman observes:

Iranian retaliation might be measured with the understanding that if it’s not properly calibrated, the U.S. and Israel could begin taking out Iranian command-and-control targets next. If the symbols of the regime begin crumbling, the oppressed Iranian people might find the courage to finish the job. If there’s anything the mullahs fear more than the U.S. military, it’s their own citizens.