Contemplating the disastrous American retreat from Kabul, Eran Lerman addresses how it will affect the Middle East:

If the perception of an Islamist ascendancy takes hold, the implications for the region, and for the world, are liable to be profound. . . . The direct strategic impact of what happens in Afghanistan, landlocked between Pakistan, central Asia, and Iran, may be limited. [But] on the level of symbolism, namely the sense that “the arc of history” now bends towards Islamist victories, the imprint of the scenes from Kabul may be devastating. The consequence for regional stability could be severe; and vulnerable regimes may feel the need to cast their lot with the winners, or even to look to Iran for shelter.

As former U.S. allies are executed in a public way, and women are relegated back to servitude, the message to the rest of the Muslim world, and beyond it, could be quite dangerous. Has the West, and specifically the U.S., become what the prophet Isaiah called “a broken reed”?

Lerman goes on to suggest some damage-control measures:

To counter this impact as much as possible, it would be vital for the U.S. to demonstrate—elsewhere, since the Afghan case is clearly beyond salvation—that it is not a spent force. . . . Central to any such demonstration, given what we witnessed in Afghanistan, would be the way the U.S. deals with Iran’s defiant conduct.

One of the keys to the survival of the pro-Western forces in southeast Asia, after the fall of Saigon in 1975, had been their ability to come together—despite deep historical differences and grievances—in the form of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations). It was created already in 1967 but was given its present form and functions only . . . in 1976; it was only during the mid-1990s, after the Soviet collapse, that Communist former enemies, including Vietnam, queued up to join it. To some extent, and despite the obvious differences, [ASEAN] can serve as a general template for those Middle East nations who fear the consequences of American retreat.

Last week, the New York Times reported, based on unnamed sources within the Trump administration, that the president had asked Israel not to carry out a planned strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. That is, somebody deliberately gave this information to the press, which later tried to confirm it by speaking with other officials. Amit Segal writes that, “according to figures in Israel’s security establishment,” this is “the most serious leak in Israel’s history.” He explains:

As Israel is reportedly planning what may well be one of its most consequential military operations ever, the New York Times lays out for the Iranians what Israel will target, when it will carry out the operation, and how. That’s not just any other leak.

Seth Mandel looks into the leaker’s logic:

The primary purpose of the [Times] article is not as a record of internal deliberations but as an instrument of policy itself. Namely, to obstruct future U.S. and Israeli foreign policy by divulging enough details of Israel’s plans in order to protect Iran’s nuclear sites. The idea is to force Israeli planners back to the drawing board, thus delaying a possible future strike on Iran until Iranian air defenses have been rebuilt.

The leak is the point. It’s a tactical play, more or less, to help Iran torpedo American action.

The leaker, Mandel explains—and the Times itself implies—is likely aligned with the faction in the administration that wants to see the U.S. retreat from the world stage and from its alliance with Israel, a faction that includes Vice-President J.D. Vance, Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, and the president’s own chief of staff Susie Wiles.

Yet it’s also possible, if less likely, that the plans were leaked in support of administration policy rather than out of factional infighting. Eliezer Marom argues that the leak was “part of the negotiations and serves to clarify to the Iranians that there is a real attack plan that Trump stopped at the last moment to conduct negotiations.”