While there are many issues about which Tehran and Moscow don’t see eye to eye, Bat Chen Feldman and Daniel Rakov argue that the two governments have grown closer over the past year. The Kremlin is likely selling weapons and other military technology to the Islamic Republic, and both have invested a great deal of effort in keeping Bashar al-Assad in power in Syria. But their relationship goes even further:
In the past few months there has also been greater military cooperation between the countries, especially in the naval field. Since the beginning of 2021, the Russian navy has reportedly protected Iranian ships in the Mediterranean Sea en route to Syria. In April, the national Russian news agency Sputnik reported the establishment of a Russian-Iranian-Syrian coordination mechanism in the Mediterranean Sea, in order to ensure the supply of oil from Iran to Syria.
These reports appear to be a message to Israel, against the backdrop of attacks against Iranian ships attributed to Israel. According to Israeli sources, these ships carried “game-changing” weapons to Syria, and not just oil cargo. In February, on the eve of the start of the Vienna talks [about renewing the 2015 nuclear deal], Russia conducted a joint naval exercise with Iran.
In addition, this year Russia strengthened its relations with the Lebanese Hizballah, and continued to maintain high-profile relations with Hashd al-Shaabi, which comprises dozens of pro-Iranian militias in Iraq. In March, a Hizballah delegation visited Moscow for the first visit in a decade and met with Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov—the most senior figure with whom representatives of the organization have ever met. Unlike European countries or the United States, Russia opposes defining Hizballah as a terrorist organization, sees it as a legitimate political force in Lebanon, and maintains close relations with it in the context of joint combat with Iran in Syria.
Read more on Institute for National Security Studies: https://www.inss.org.il/publication/iran-russia/