Last week, the Sunni billionaire Najib Mikati was chosen to be the next head of the Lebanese government, although it is not clear whether he will be able to form a governing coalition. His selection comes while the country sinks ever deeper into an economic crisis that brought down the previous prime minister. Reportedly Mikati has the support of both France and the U.S., but Hanin Ghaddar argues that such support is not deserved. Mikati, she writes, is the preferred candidate of the Iran-backed guerrilla group Hizballah, which exercises de-facto control over the troubled country:

Hizballah and its allies . . . prefer controlling a failed state over allowing reforms that chip away at the power they gained in the 2018 parliamentary election.

Mikati has already served as prime minister twice: in 2005 and again in 2011-2013. In both cases, Hizballah essentially imposed him on the country to serve its own interests. In January 2011, for example, he was chosen to paper over the militia’s Beirut coup—an infamous incident in which [then-Prime Minister Saad] Hariri was purposefully humiliated by learning of his government’s collapse while he was in a meeting with President Obama. When the Druze leader Walid Jumblatt and other factions sought to reinstate Hariri, Hizballah dispatched additional armed members throughout the capital and outlying Druze communities. The literal and potential threat conveyed by these “Black Shirts” was clear, and Mikati was unanimously nominated [to replace Hariri] soon thereafter.

[A]ny government formed by Mikati will ultimately be a waste of time. The international community should not wait to see if he succeeds, let alone whether his government will implement reforms. This game of buying time is one that Hizballah and other [Lebanese] elites have mastered over the years, most recently during Lebanon’s maritime-border negotiations with Israel. The United States and Europe should not let Beirut use this tactic to delay punitive measures against those who perpetuate corruption or hinder reforms. Doing so would only play into Hizballah’s hands and extend the humanitarian crisis indefinitely.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.