On September 17, a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) approved the Islamic Republic’s accession as a member. Iran first applied to join in 2008, but was rejected. Jonathan Spyer explains the significance of this development in light of tensions between the U.S. and China:

The SCO, established by China and Russia in 2001, is an economic, political and security alliance. It currently includes eight states—China, Russia, Pakistan, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Together, these states account for 20 percent of global GDP, and include 40 percent of the world’s population.

For China, Iran is a powerful, stable, non-threatening state. Tehran’s anti-U.S. stance is of use to China in that it ensures that there is no chance of the country hedging its bets in the emerging strategic contest between Washington and Beijing. China does not of course share Iran’s governing ideology, but the fact that this ideology is Shiite means that Iran does not constitute a potentially disruptive source of appeal to China’s own, overwhelmingly Sunni, restive Muslim populations.

[Moreover] China is unlikely to be indifferent to the fact, still improperly acknowledged by naïve Western observers, of Tehran’s domination of the entire land mass between the Iraq-Iran border and the Mediterranean Sea, and consisting of three nominal states—Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.

The SCO is not yet anything close to a China-led strategic alliance arrayed against the West. Its members include India, a rival of China and a Western ally. Nor is the SCO aligned with Iran in its defiance of the international system regarding its nuclear program. . . . Nevertheless, and with all the appropriate cautions against oversimplification, a general direction to events can be discerned. And it points towards closer alignment between Beijing and Tehran, on the basis of hard, shared long-term interests. Iran’s accession to the SCO does not cement this process. Rather, it is a signpost along the way.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.