While campaigning for mayor of New York City in 2013, Bill de Blasio developed important relationships with influential ḥaredi leaders, which would serve him well politically. In turn he, delivered on two key promises: easing restrictions on a controversial circumcision practice, known as m’tsitsah b’peh—considered essential by some Orthodox rabbinic authorities—and curbing government interference in religious schools. But de Blasio leaves office unpopular with Jewish constituents across the spectrum. Jacob Kornbluh writes:

Liberal supporters chafed at what they saw as de Blasio’s overly solicitous attitude toward the Orthodox. “All the Reform leaders wanted to talk about with him was his stance on m’tsitsah b’peh and that he was too supportive of Israel,” said one former senior aide, who spoke on condition of anonymity to share what had been the private conversations.

But de Blasio and Orthodox Jews — both leadership and their followers — had a serious falling out when the pandemic hit. . . . The mayor managed to enrage much of the Jewish community with a single tweet in April 2020. After witnessing a large Orthodox funeral in Williamsburg, de Blasio warned “the Jewish community, and all communities” that police would vigorously enforce social distancing rules that prohibited such public gatherings. Many Orthodox leaders took offense to the singling out of their people and this particular funeral, and asked why de Blasio didn’t crack down on crowds in public parks. Others were infuriated by what they saw as “scapegoating” of all Jews based on the behavior of one sect.

De Blasio . . . has been an ardent supporter and is also an outspoken critic of the Boycott, Sanctions, and Divestment movement. Barely a month in office, de Blasio delivered a fervent pro-Israel speech at a closed AIPAC meeting, and faced fierce liberal backlash.

A former senior aide said, “He believes the creation of Israel as a Jewish state is a correct and necessary outcome of the Holocaust. That’s all. . . . That doesn’t mean its government can do no wrong or that its treatment of Palestinians doesn’t need drastic improvement.”

Of course, to Israelis and committed Zionists, the idea that the Holocaust somehow justifies Israel’s existence—and that Jews would otherwise not have a right to self-national determination—is anathema.

Stephen Daisley writes about the slaying of Yaron Lischinsky and Sarah Milgrim:

Yaron and Sarah were murdered in a climate of lies and vilification and hatred. . . . The more institutions participate in this collective madness, the more madness there will be. The more elected officials and NGOs misrepresent the predictable consequences of asymmetric warfare in densely populated territories, where much of the infrastructure of everyday life has a dual civilian/terrorist purpose, the more the citizenries of North America and Europe will come to regard Israelis and Jews as a people who lust unquenchably after blood.

The most intolerant anti-Zionism is becoming a mainstream view, indulged by liberal societies, more concerned with not conflating irrational hatred of Israel with irrational hatred of Jews—as though the distinction between the two is all that well defined anymore.

For years now, and especially after the October 7 massacre, the call has gone up from the pro-Palestinian movement to put Palestine at the heart of Western politics. To pursue the struggle against Zionism in every country, on every platform, and in every setting. To wage worldwide resistance to Israel, not only in Wadi al-Far’a but in Washington, DC. “Globalize the intifada,” they chanted. This is what it looks like.