In his recent biography of King George III, the English historian Andrew Roberts presents a revisionist history of the last monarch to reign over the thirteen colonies—presenting him as a prudent ruler and even going so far as to dispute some of the charges leveled against him in the Declaration of Independence. After discussing his book with Jonathan Tobin, Roberts goes on to address attitudes toward Jews and Israel in contemporary British politics. He makes the case that anti-Semitism in the UK has grown worse since the Israel-hating leftwing firebrand Jeremy Corbyn lost his position as leader of the Labor party. (Video, 45 minutes. The conversation moves to Jewish topics around the 31-minute mark.)
Jeremy Corbyn May Be Gone from Britain’s Labor Party, But Anti-Semitism Continues to Flourish
Syria’s Druze Uprising, and What It Means for the Region
When the Arab Spring came to Syria in 2011, the Druze for the most part remained loyal to the regime—which has generally depended on the support of religious minorities such as the Druze and thus afforded them a modicum of protection. But in the past several weeks that has changed, with sustained anti-government protests in the Druze-dominated southwestern province of Suwayda. Ehud Yaari evaluates the implications of this shift:
The disillusionment of the Druze with Bashar al-Assad, their suspicion of militias backed by Iran and Hizballah on the outskirts of their region, and growing economic hardships are fanning the flames of revolt. In Syrian Druze circles, there is now open discussion of “self-rule,” for example replacing government offices and services with local Druze alternative bodies.
Is there a politically acceptable way to assist the Druze and prevent the regime from the violent reoccupation of Jebel al-Druze, [as they call the area in which they live]? The answer is yes. It would require Jordan to open a short humanitarian corridor through the village of al-Anat, the southernmost point of the Druze community, less than three kilometers from the Syrian-Jordanian border.
Setting up a corridor to the Druze would require a broad consensus among Western and Gulf Arab states, which have currently suspended the process of normalization with Assad. . . . The cost of such an operation would not be high compared to the humanitarian corridors currently operating in northern Syria. It could be developed in stages, and perhaps ultimately include, if necessary, providing the Druze with weapons to defend their territory. A quick reminder: during the Islamic State attack on Suwayda province in 2018, the Druze demonstrated an ability to assemble close to 50,000 militia men almost overnight.