As Moscow is building up its forces near the Ukrainian border, its representatives are involved in talks in Vienna over the possible restoration of the 2015 agreement to restrain Iran’s nuclear program—to which Russia is a party. Anna Borshchevskaya explores the link between these two aspects of Vladimir Putin’s policy:

Although Moscow has always preferred a non-nuclear-armed Iran, it does not necessarily share Western goals, methods, or redlines on this issue. . . . Russia has also used its support for sanctions as leverage to extract concessions from the West.

Even when they occur at the same time, Putin’s policy decisions on Ukraine and Iran are better viewed as manifestations of a general anti-Western strategy than as directly connected actions. Hence, Washington should be cautious about how much store it puts in Moscow’s assurances on either front unless they are accompanied by concrete indications of deeper policy shifts.

Years of [nuclear] talks elevated Moscow’s standing as a global power without whom major diplomatic decisions could not be made, bolstering its position as a counterweight to the West . . . . Meanwhile, Russian commercial and defense transactions with Iran appear to have grown since the U.S. withdrawal from the [agreement. According to the Tehran Times, total bilateral trade increased from $1.74 billion in 2018 to $2 billion in 2019. . . . Moreover, Moscow is reportedly poised to sell 32 Su-35 fighter jets to Iran, which would significantly bolster the country’s air force.

Western policymakers may wish to believe that Russia can be helpful on Iran even if it makes harmful moves against Ukraine, but they need to see the bigger picture—Putin’s anti-Western posture has never been limited to Europe.

Yesterday, the Iranian foreign minister flew to Geneva to meet with European diplomats. President Trump, meanwhile, indicated that cease-fire negotiations might soon begin with Iran, which would presumably involve Tehran agreeing to make concessions regarding its nuclear program, while Washington pressures Israel to halt its military activities. According to Israeli media, Iran already began putting out feelers to the U.S. earlier this week. Aviram Bellaishe considers the purpose of these overtures:

The regime’s request to return to negotiations stems from the principle of deception and delay that has guided it for decades. Iran wants to extricate itself from a situation of total destruction of its nuclear facilities. It understands that to save the nuclear program, it must stop at a point that would allow it to return to it in the shortest possible time. So long as the negotiation process leads to halting strikes on its military capabilities and preventing the destruction of the nuclear program, and enables the transfer of enriched uranium to a safe location, it can simultaneously create the two tracks in which it specializes—a false facade of negotiations alongside a hidden nuclear race.