So far, the Islamic Republic’s nuclear negotiators in Vienna still refuse to sit in the same room as their American counterparts, and they seem unlikely to agree to terms even the eager-to-negotiate Biden administration can stomach. But rather than walk away, explains Elliott Abrams, the White House might instead consent to a limited agreement

in which Iran does one thing—such as agreeing to stop enriching uranium to 60 percent—in exchange for billions of dollars in sanctions relief. A recent visit to Vienna by South Korean officials suggests that unfreezing the $7 billion Iran has on the books there will be step one. Step two will likely be lifting all sanctions on Iranian oil exports, allowing the regime to increase sales to China and others in Asia immediately. My own guess: in exchange for Iran’s ceasing to enrich uranium to 60 percent, virtually all U.S. sanctions will be lifted.

This “less for less” deal would be a terrible agreement. It could really be termed “less for more”—Iran does less and gets more. It would ignore Iran’s subversion of the IAEA and its refusal to allow serious inspections. It would ignore Iran’s refusal to deal with the “previous military dimensions” of its nuclear program, which are quite obviously real (the nuclear archive purloined by Israel proved that) and still exist today. It would ignore Iran’s use of advanced generations of centrifuges and would certainly permit enrichment above the 3.67-percent limit agreed in Obama’s 2015 deal. And it would supply the regime with billions—likely tens of billions—of dollars to use, for instance, subverting Iraq, fighting in Yemen, and supporting Hamas, and Hizballah.

The Biden administration could have kept the pressure on until the Iranian regime—aware far more than the White House is of the hatred ordinary Iranians feel for their leaders—faced economic crisis and agreed to a better deal. Instead, Team Biden decided on the Obama administration approach, and is on a path toward an agreement that rewards Iran’s malfeasance and gets it closer and closer to a nuclear weapon.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.