The Rise of the “Arab Spring Generation” Is Changing the Middle East—Perhaps for the Better

The 20th century saw an Arab world caught up in a variety of ideological currents—Arab nationalism, Communism, Baathism, and Shiite and Sunni Islamism—but the younger generation, according to Nir Boms and Hussein Aboubakr seems less vulnerable to their appeal. Not long ago, the movements loosely termed the “resistance” and associated with Iran, Hizballah, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Islamic State—which sought the overthrow of regimes in Egypt, Jordan, and the Gulf—had a great deal of mainstream popularity. But this isn’t true for those born after the cold war and shaped by the 2011 uprisings and their aftermath:

The 21st century found the Middle East younger and more educated than ever, with over 65 percent under the age of thirty and ready for change. . . . Resistance groups and the drive to suppress them led to the killing of over half a million people in Syria and hundreds of thousands in Libya, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen. In the new approach, resistance is no longer viewed as the key for political redemption; rather, it is perceived as an obstacle preventing a better future. . . . For the first time in half a century, a new alignment among the rulers, the ruled, and leaders in the Arab world is challenging the inertia of the mid-20th century Arab political arrangement.

The “Arab Spring Generation” of restive, young, and educated Arab youth has clearly asserted new priorities. Access to formal education has had significant implications for Arab expectations of their living conditions.

[A] 2019 survey found out that 79 percent of young Arabs believe that the Arab world needs to reform its religious institutions; meanwhile 66 percent believe that religion plays too great a role in the Middle East. When asked, in 2015 and 2016, what the biggest obstacle facing the Middle East was, Arab youth prioritized Islamic State and the threat of terrorism, followed by unemployment, civil unrest, and the rising cost of living. Subsequent surveys further stressed the economic factors.

It is important to understand that Israel is at the center of the above discussion. It is seen as a player in the camp of regional stability, a gateway for economic diversification and development, a key in containing Iran, and, most importantly, in attempts to alienate Islamist ideologies from the mainstream. Moreover, since Islamists have cherished the anti-normalization agenda as their cause, it will be more natural for the pragmatists to adopt the exact opposite [position].

Read more at Religions

More about: Arab Spring, Israel-Arab relations, Middle East

Hizballah Is Learning Israel’s Weak Spots

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.

Read more at Ynet

More about: Hizballah, Iron Dome, Israeli Security