The 20th century saw an Arab world caught up in a variety of ideological currents—Arab nationalism, Communism, Baathism, and Shiite and Sunni Islamism—but the younger generation, according to Nir Boms and Hussein Aboubakr seems less vulnerable to their appeal. Not long ago, the movements loosely termed the “resistance” and associated with Iran, Hizballah, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Islamic State—which sought the overthrow of regimes in Egypt, Jordan, and the Gulf—had a great deal of mainstream popularity. But this isn’t true for those born after the cold war and shaped by the 2011 uprisings and their aftermath:

The 21st century found the Middle East younger and more educated than ever, with over 65 percent under the age of thirty and ready for change. . . . Resistance groups and the drive to suppress them led to the killing of over half a million people in Syria and hundreds of thousands in Libya, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen. In the new approach, resistance is no longer viewed as the key for political redemption; rather, it is perceived as an obstacle preventing a better future. . . . For the first time in half a century, a new alignment among the rulers, the ruled, and leaders in the Arab world is challenging the inertia of the mid-20th century Arab political arrangement.

The “Arab Spring Generation” of restive, young, and educated Arab youth has clearly asserted new priorities. Access to formal education has had significant implications for Arab expectations of their living conditions.

[A] 2019 survey found out that 79 percent of young Arabs believe that the Arab world needs to reform its religious institutions; meanwhile 66 percent believe that religion plays too great a role in the Middle East. When asked, in 2015 and 2016, what the biggest obstacle facing the Middle East was, Arab youth prioritized Islamic State and the threat of terrorism, followed by unemployment, civil unrest, and the rising cost of living. Subsequent surveys further stressed the economic factors.

It is important to understand that Israel is at the center of the above discussion. It is seen as a player in the camp of regional stability, a gateway for economic diversification and development, a key in containing Iran, and, most importantly, in attempts to alienate Islamist ideologies from the mainstream. Moreover, since Islamists have cherished the anti-normalization agenda as their cause, it will be more natural for the pragmatists to adopt the exact opposite [position].

As this newsletter noted last week, Gaza is not suffering from famine, and the efforts to suggest that it is—which have been going on since at least the beginning of last year—are based on deliberate manipulation of the data. Nor, as Shany Mor explains, does international law require Israel to feed its enemies:

Article 23 of the Fourth Geneva Convention does oblige High Contracting Parties to allow for the free passage of medical and religious supplies along with “essential foodstuff, clothing, and tonics intended for children under fifteen” for the civilians of another High Contracting Party, as long as there is no serious reason for fearing that “the consignments may be diverted from their destination,” or “that a definite advantage may accrue to the military efforts or economy of the enemy” by the provision.

The Hamas regime in Gaza is, of course, not a High Contracting Party, and, more importantly, Israel has reason to fear both that aid provisions are diverted by Hamas and that a direct advantage is accrued to it by such diversions. Not only does Hamas take provisions for its own forces, but its authorities sell provisions donated by foreign bodies and use the money to finance its war. It’s notable that the first reports of Hamas’s financial difficulties emerged only in the past few weeks, once provisions were blocked.

Yet, since the war began, even European states considered friendly to Israel have repeatedly demanded that Israel “allow unhindered passage of humanitarian aid” and refrain from seizing territory or imposing “demographic change”—which means, in practice, that Gazan civilians can’t seek refuge abroad. These principles don’t merely constitute a separate system of international law that applies only to Israel, but prolong the suffering of the people they are ostensibly meant to protect:

By insisting that Hamas can’t lose any territory in the war it launched, the international community has invented a norm that never before existed and removed one of the few levers Israel has to pressure it to end the war and release the hostages.

These commitments have . . . made the plight of the hostages much worse and much longer. They made the war much longer than necessary and much deadlier for both sides. And they locked a large civilian population in a war zone where the de-facto governing authority was not only indifferent to civilian losses on its own side, but actually had much to gain by it.