The Betrayal of the Syrian People

When Bashar al-Assad began his war against his own subjects eleven years ago, Arab popular opinion swiftly turned against him, and Arab rulers shunned him—not only because of his brutality, but also because they felt threatened by the growing power of his Iranian patrons. The West, and even such international bodies as the World Health Organization (WHO), followed suit. Undeterred by sanctions and condemnations and with the assurance of support from Moscow and Tehran, Assad went about bombing his country into submission. That Arab leaders are now mending relations with Damascus demonstrates that his persistence has paid off, if not for the country he rules, then at least for himself. Marwan Safar Jalani, himself a refugee from Syria, comments:

In June, the World Health Organization appointed Syria to its executive board. Interpol readmitted Syria to its network in October. Algeria and Egypt have pushed to reinvite Syria to Arab League membership. . . . These international bodies and nations appear to have either forgiven, forgotten, or chosen to ignore the reasons Syria was cast out from their community. But in doing so, they normalize the atrocities committed by or on behalf of Assad’s regime and risk emboldening other leaders to act without fear of major censure or retribution.

A regime that has been known to bomb hospitals cannot be a member of the Executive Board of the World Health Organization. A regime that tortures and tracks its dissidents at home and abroad through intelligence services must not regain access to Interpol’s databases.

The United States, France, and Britain stress that they are against normalizing Assad, but shy away from urging allies and international organizations not to do so. This issue should be high on—if not at the top of—their foreign-policy agenda, because the rehabilitation of Assad poses a direct threat to the post-World War II order—which already faces challenges on other fronts, such as the current Russia-Ukraine tensions. This issue is an easy one to take a stand on. Syria is not a nuclear power or the regional power it once was. Nor is it a major energy supplier. Standing firm against his rehabilitation does not cost much.

Read more at New York Times

More about: Arab World, Bashar al-Assad, Syrian civil war, U.S. Foreign policy, WHO

American Middle East Policy Should Focus Less on Stability and More on Weakening Enemies

Feb. 10 2025

To Elliott Abrams, Donald Trump’s plan to remove the entire population of Gaza while the Strip is rebuilt is “unworkable,” at least “as a concrete proposal.” But it is welcome insofar as “its sheer iconoclasm might lead to a healthy rethinking of U.S. strategy and perhaps of Arab and Israeli policies as well.” The U.S., writes Abrams, must not only move beyond the failed approach to Gaza, but also must reject other assumptions that have failed time and again. One is the commitment to an illusory stability:

For two decades, what American policymakers have called “stability” has meant the preservation of the situation in which Gaza was entirely under Hamas control, Hizballah dominated Lebanon, and Iran’s nuclear program advanced. A better term for that situation would have been “erosion,” as U.S. influence steadily slipped away and Washington’s allies became less secure. Now, the United States has a chance to stop that process and aim instead for “reinforcement”: bolstering its interests and allies and actively weakening its adversaries. The result would be a region where threats diminish and U.S. alliances grow stronger.

Such an approach must be applied above all to the greatest threat in today’s Middle East, that of a nuclear Iran:

Trump clearly remains open to the possibility (however small) that an aging [Iranian supreme leader Ali] Khamenei, after witnessing the collapse of [his regional proxies], mulling the possibility of brutal economic sanctions, and being fully aware of the restiveness of his own population, would accept an agreement that stops the nuclear-weapons program and halts payments and arms shipments to Iran’s proxies. But Trump should be equally aware of the trap Khamenei might be setting for him: a phony new negotiation meant to ensnare Washington in talks for years, with Tehran’s negotiators leading Trump on with the mirage of a successful deal and a Nobel Peace Prize at the end of the road while the Iranian nuclear-weapons program grows in the shadows.

Read more at Foreign Affairs

More about: Iran, Middle East, U.S. Foreign policy