Since 1979, Egypt has been a close ally of both Syria and the U.S, but, from the Obama administration on, Washington has sent Cairo mixed messages. That fact, combined with overlapping interests in Libya and Syria, has led President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to look increasingly to Russia. Ramy Aziz argues that the G7—the U.S., Japan, Canada, and the major European countries—can use the present situation in Ukraine to bring Egypt squarely back into their camp:

Russia is trying to influence Egyptians and portray them as supporting its attack on Ukraine. Russian officials and media sources are spreading false news about Russian actions, while using language claiming that Egypt is a past and present Russian ally in the region.

It is true that relations have grown between Russia and Egypt since Sisi came to power following the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood in 2013. Sisi received unequivocal political support from Putin at a time when relations between Egypt and Washington as well as Brussels were turbulent. Moscow likewise does not bring issues of freedom and human rights into its dealings with Egypt, which is convenient for the Sisi regime. Putin has repeatedly attempted to exploit this relationship to establish Russian influence in Egypt and return it to Russia’s orbit, as it was in the days of the Soviet Union.

These ties help explain Egypt’s weak official position on the Russian attack on Ukraine. However, it is also important to recognize that Egypt’s equivocal stance on Russia’s brutal military campaign in Ukraine is shaped by a set of fears over the effect Russia can have on the country’s economic stability. While these fears have some foundation, further assurances from the G7 and Cairo’s own policy adjustments can ameliorate pressure Russia could exert on the Egyptian economy. This can allow Cairo to side with its strategic allies regarding a conflict where Russia has clearly demonstrated itself as the aggressor.

In choosing its next steps, Egypt must also remember that it needs Western political support on a number of sensitive issues, such as its ongoing concerns over water and the Renaissance Dam.

Analyzing the recent direct Iranian attack on Israel, and Israel’s security situation more generally, Michael Oren looks to the 2015 agreement to restrain Iran’s nuclear program. That, and President Biden’s efforts to resurrect the deal after Donald Trump left it, are in his view the source of the current crisis:

Of the original motivations for the deal—blocking Iran’s path to the bomb and transforming Iran into a peaceful nation—neither remained. All Biden was left with was the ability to kick the can down the road and to uphold Barack Obama’s singular foreign-policy achievement.

In order to achieve that result, the administration has repeatedly refused to punish Iran for its malign actions:

Historians will survey this inexplicable record and wonder how the United States not only allowed Iran repeatedly to assault its citizens, soldiers, and allies but consistently rewarded it for doing so. They may well conclude that in a desperate effort to avoid getting dragged into a regional Middle Eastern war, the U.S. might well have precipitated one.

While America’s friends in the Middle East, especially Israel, have every reason to feel grateful for the vital assistance they received in intercepting Iran’s missile and drone onslaught, they might also ask what the U.S. can now do differently to deter Iran from further aggression. . . . Tehran will see this weekend’s direct attack on Israel as a victory—their own—for their ability to continue threatening Israel and destabilizing the Middle East with impunity.

Israel, of course, must respond differently. Our target cannot simply be the Iranian proxies that surround our country and that have waged war on us since October 7, but, as the Saudis call it, “the head of the snake.”