Dictators, notes Ben Cohen, have a habit of embracing anti-Semitism—whether they are fascist, Communist, or Islamist; whether they rule in pre-World War II Eastern Europe or the post-World War II Middle East. Vladimir Putin appears to be an exception to this pattern, but there are reasons for Jewish worry:

Following the defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945, Jews finally enjoyed an unprecedented flowering, cemented by the establishment of a Jewish democratic state and the confident participation of Diaspora Jewish communities in the political, cultural, and commercial lives of their countries. Such a flowering was—and remains—possible only within the framework of liberal democracies like the U.S. and Western Europe for one very good reason: liberal democracy enables Jews to organize as a community, and to speak out without fear, without needing an authoritarian protector to lord it over them.

However, a protector is exactly what the 200,000-odd Jews who live in Russia have in Putin. Due to that, their position is far more precarious than ours in America; . . . while anti-Semitism in Russia has taken a back seat under Putin, it is still present—and can be invoked should conditions suit. Moreover, Putin already has a nasty habit of citing Nazism and the Holocaust to justify his aggression against Ukraine, and he has cynically highlighted historic anti-Semitism in Ukraine to bolster his delegitimization campaign against his neighbor. That rhetoric is sure to intensify, and any Jewish discomfort with Putin’s appropriation of the Holocaust for his war strategy will not be regarded sympathetically in the Kremlin.

Yesterday, the Iranian foreign minister flew to Geneva to meet with European diplomats. President Trump, meanwhile, indicated that cease-fire negotiations might soon begin with Iran, which would presumably involve Tehran agreeing to make concessions regarding its nuclear program, while Washington pressures Israel to halt its military activities. According to Israeli media, Iran already began putting out feelers to the U.S. earlier this week. Aviram Bellaishe considers the purpose of these overtures:

The regime’s request to return to negotiations stems from the principle of deception and delay that has guided it for decades. Iran wants to extricate itself from a situation of total destruction of its nuclear facilities. It understands that to save the nuclear program, it must stop at a point that would allow it to return to it in the shortest possible time. So long as the negotiation process leads to halting strikes on its military capabilities and preventing the destruction of the nuclear program, and enables the transfer of enriched uranium to a safe location, it can simultaneously create the two tracks in which it specializes—a false facade of negotiations alongside a hidden nuclear race.