“The Biden administration,” notes Andrea Stricker, “has two goals that are at odds with each other.” It wishes to ramp up economic pressure on Moscow, and to revive the 2015 nuclear deal with Tehran. That deal was an economic boon to Russia, enabling the Kremlin to undertake civil nuclear projects in the Islamic Republic worth billions of dollars. In 2019, the Trump administration announced that Russian entities would face sanctions for continued nuclear work in Iran; in February 2022, the Biden administration waived these sanctions. Stricker argues in favor of a swift “course correction.”

Last month, Russia forced a pause in the Vienna talks to ensure the protection of its financial interests. Moscow seeks to resume several civil nuclear projects in Iran that it previously carried out under the JCPOA, [or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, as the 2015 deal is formally known], such as a $10 billion contract for Russia to build two additional reactor units at the Bushehr nuclear power plant. The Kremlin also seeks to recoup a $500 million debt for past work. More broadly, Russia wants to avoid running into Western sanctions for any such nuclear work in Iran.

Yet there is no technical reason a nuclear deal with Iran should protect the Kremlin’s interests. On March 22, when reporters asked whether Moscow had to be the party that carries out JCPOA-permitted projects, the U.S. national security advisor Jake Sullivan stated, “We don’t have to rely on any given country for any particular element of the deal, but that is a role that Russia played in the past.” The following day, the State Department spokesman Ned Price seemed even more amenable to protecting Moscow’s interests; he said Russia’s role was one “we’d be willing to entertain.”

This approach is mistaken, especially for an administration that claims it wants to hold Russia accountable for its aggression against Ukraine. Furthermore, according to an April 8 Washington Free Beacon report, if Moscow retains participation in these projects, several Russian state-run firms stand to benefit.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.