Today, the United States co-sponsored a UN General Assembly resolution that may weaken the force of its veto on the Security Council. Elliott Abrams argues that this seemingly innocuous measure is intended to be the first step toward either abolishing permanent Security Council members’ veto power altogether or granting the General Assembly the authority to override a veto.

A moment’s thought shows how damaging this might be to U.S. interests. The United States is a global power that has been involved in military activities repeatedly. Without our veto power, the Security Council could do literally anything: subject American troops to International Criminal Court jurisdiction; subject the United States to new international treaties or agreements that impose standards to which we object and outlaw military activities we consider vital to our national security; and outside the area of national security, adopt standards relating to parents, children, family law, and gender rules that we find objectionable, or impose rules against “insults to religion” that clearly violate the First Amendment. Without the veto there is simply no way to protect against limitless actions against our national interest.

Moreover, the long list of U.S. vetoes of resolutions reflects the terrible, long-lasting bias of the United Nations against Israel. . . . The United States has used its veto in the UN Security Council fourteen times since 2000, and twelve of those fourteen were exercised to protect Israel from biased and destructive resolutions. . . . . Of course those who specialize in attacking Israel, and U.S. support for Israel, want the veto eliminated—and that is another very good explanation of why it must be maintained. Delegitimizing the veto is a step toward delegitimizing Israel.

Earlier this month, an operative working for, or in conjunction with, Hizballah snuck across the Israel-Lebanese border and planted a sophisticated explosive near the town of Megiddo, which killed a civilian when detonated. On Thursday, another Iranian proxy group launched a drone at a U.S. military base in Syria, killing a contractor and wounding five American soldiers. The former attack appears to be an attempt to change what Israeli officials and analysts call the “rules of the game”: the mutually understood redlines that keep the Jewish state and Hizballah from going to war. Nadav Pollak explains how he believes Jerusalem should respond:

Israel cannot stop at pointing fingers and issuing harsh statements. The Megiddo attack might have caused much more damage given the additional explosives and other weapons the terrorist was carrying; even the lone device detonated at Megiddo could have easily been used to destroy a larger target such as a bus. Moreover, Hizballah’s apparent effort to test (or shift) Jerusalem’s redlines on a dangerous frontier needs to be answered. If [the terrorist group’s leader Hassan] Nasrallah has misjudged Israel, then it is incumbent on Jerusalem to make this clear.

Unfortunately, the days of keeping the north quiet at any cost have passed, especially if Hizballah no longer believes Israel is willing to respond forcefully. The last time the organization perceived Israel to be weak was in 2006, and its resultant cross-border operations (e.g., kidnapping Israeli soldiers) led to a war that proved to be devastating, mostly to Lebanon. If Hizballah tries to challenge Israel again, Israel should be ready to take strong action such as targeting the group’s commanders and headquarters in Lebanon—even if this runs the risk of intense fire exchanges or war.

Relevant preparations for this option should include increased monitoring of Hizballah officials—overtly and covertly—and perhaps even the transfer of some military units to the north. Hizballah needs to know that Israel is no longer shying away from conflict, since this may be the only way of forcing the group to return to the old, accepted rules of the game and step down from the precipice of a war that it does not appear to want.