In exchange for agreeing to return to the 2015 nuclear deal, Tehran is demanding that the U.S. cease to consider its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO). Last week, Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced that the U.S. has no intention of doing so, yet reports have also circulated that Foggy Bottom is seeking a workaround of some sort. Elliott Abrams and Behnam Ben Taleblu argue that any such compromise “would be pure strategic folly.”

To begin with, the IRGC was created four decades ago as a parallel military force to the national army. . . . In the ensuing decades, the IRGC has become a powerful, and perhaps the most powerful, player inside the Islamic Republic. . . . The closest analogy is to the Soviet KGB at the height of its powers.

The IRGC has engaged in or supported acts of terrorism, kidnapping, or regional destabilization across multiple continents throughout its existence and has been at the forefront of the Islamic Republic’s efforts to “export” its revolution. The IRGC is the chief military unit responsible for Iran’s foreign operations, with branches like the Quds Force that train and equip proxies to target U.S. military personnel, interests, and partners. During the Iraq War (2003-2011) for example, Iran, through the IRGC and its proxies, was assessed as being complicit in over 600 U.S. fatalities and thousands of injuries. This means that a reported one in six U.S. deaths during the Iraq war can be traced to the Quds Force, directly or indirectly.

The FTO designation is . . . America’s most powerful counterterrorism authority and has been singled out by Tehran for that reason. Iran is unlikely to have jeopardized a nuclear deal that stands to free an estimated 130 billion dollars of frozen assets over the revocation of a designation that some chalk up to being mere “symbolism.” . . . Removing the IRGC from the FTO list will endanger American lives.

Yesterday, the Iranian foreign minister flew to Geneva to meet with European diplomats. President Trump, meanwhile, indicated that cease-fire negotiations might soon begin with Iran, which would presumably involve Tehran agreeing to make concessions regarding its nuclear program, while Washington pressures Israel to halt its military activities. According to Israeli media, Iran already began putting out feelers to the U.S. earlier this week. Aviram Bellaishe considers the purpose of these overtures:

The regime’s request to return to negotiations stems from the principle of deception and delay that has guided it for decades. Iran wants to extricate itself from a situation of total destruction of its nuclear facilities. It understands that to save the nuclear program, it must stop at a point that would allow it to return to it in the shortest possible time. So long as the negotiation process leads to halting strikes on its military capabilities and preventing the destruction of the nuclear program, and enables the transfer of enriched uranium to a safe location, it can simultaneously create the two tracks in which it specializes—a false facade of negotiations alongside a hidden nuclear race.