Last Tuesday, the State Department released an annual report on arms control, expressing “serious concerns” regarding “possible undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran.” Anthony Ruggiero and Andrea Stricker take the report’s conclusions as further evidence that “it would be a serious mistake to revive a weaker version of the 2015 nuclear deal,” which was itself inadequate.

The new findings on Iran are part of a larger publication that assesses countries’ compliance with agreements pertaining to arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament. The latest edition of this annual report discusses the International Atomic Energy Agency’s investigation into Iran’s undeclared nuclear activities at four locations. The State Department notes that Tehran has not cooperated with the agency’s probe at those four sites, which involved Iran’s possible use or storage of nuclear material and equipment or undeclared nuclear activities.

Questions also remain about the fourth location, the site of the Islamic Republic’s alleged experiments with a uranium metal disc. In the State Department’s previous annual report, which covered 2020, the Biden administration warned that “even small amounts of undeclared uranium metal in Iran would be of serious proliferation concern given its applicability to nuclear-weapons research and development.” Just last month, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) director general Rafael Grossi told the agency’s Board of Governors that Tehran did not declare experiments relating to this nuclear-weaponization activity, violating Iran’s safeguards agreement with the agency.

In the previous edition of its compliance report, the State Department emphasized that the “ongoing investigations and Iran’s failure for much of the reporting period . . . raise concern.” That is no less true today. Iran is violating its fundamental non-proliferation commitments, not just the terms of the problematic 2015 nuclear deal.

And if that is the case, it is difficult to be believe that the Islamic Republic can be trusted to adhere to future commitments.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.