Theodor Dalrymple observes a disturbing development in Canadian law regarding euthanasia:

A 2021 Canadian law on assisted suicide contains a provision that will allow doctors to provide assisted suicide to the psychiatrically ill starting next year. Given that severe psychiatric disorder tends to cloud the judgment of those who suffer from it, one wonders who will benefit most from this law, if passed. Certainly, it might remove from society people who are often difficult, unproductive, and expensive for others. They might be encouraged to shuffle off this mortal coil as a service to their relatives or even to their county. The distinction between the voluntary and the compulsory might become blurred.

The law is a logical extension of the right to a dignified death procured by others—that is, a mode and time of death of a person’s choosing with the aid of doctors and nurses.

The slippery-slope argument, of course, has long been one of the principal objections to the legalization of assisted suicide and euthanasia. Not every slippery slope is slid down, but we have reason to suppose that, at least in some jurisdictions, it is happening.

In 2017, a research letter in the New England Journal of Medicine reported (with a sense of pride) that, in the Netherlands, 92 percent of those euthanized had serious illnesses. No explanation of the other 8 percent’s circumstances was forthcoming—the editors evidently did not think it polite to ask. The numbers were not small: as many were euthanized without serious illness as are murdered in the Netherlands in four to five years. The state, one might surmise, is complicit in more killings than all the criminals in the country combined.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.