At a July 8 meeting of the UN Security Council, Russia vetoed a proposal for sending humanitarian aid to the beleaguered people of Syria—despite months of negotiations aimed at achieving a different result. Linda Thomas-Greenfield, the American ambassador to the UN, roundly condemned the Kremlin’s behavior, but, David Adesnik argues, Washington should have done more to prevent this predictable outcome:

Moscow did not have the support of a single other member of the Security Council—twelve backed the American position and China abstained. But still, Washington folded. Why?

The Biden administration made the critical error of negotiating without leverage. It should have built up the U.S. and allied capability to deliver aid without help from UN agencies so a Russian veto would not shut down the aid pipeline. Instead, the administration let Moscow turn millions of Syrians into hostages—the only choices available to the United States and its allies were to accept Russian demands or let civilians starve.

Moscow provided ample warning that it would pursue this ruthless strategy, but the White House did not rethink its game plan. The Russians have worked for years to choke off the supply of aid to any part of Syria outside of Assad’s control. The last enclave still receiving assistance is in the northwestern part of the country, adjacent to the Turkish border. It has an estimated 4.4 million inhabitants, including one million children. Nearly two-thirds fled their homes to escape the regime’s oppression. Some 800,000 live in tents, even in winter. Many more live in ruins.

Yesterday I saw an unconfirmed report that the Biden administration has offered Israel a massive arms deal in exchange for a promise not to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. Even if the report is incorrect, there is plenty of other evidence that the White House has been trying to dissuade Jerusalem from mounting such an attack. The thinking behind this pressure is hard to fathom, as there is little Israel could do that would better serve American interests in the Middle East than putting some distance between the ayatollahs and nuclear weapons. Aaron MacLean explains why this is so, in the context of a broader discussion of strategic priorities in the Middle East and elsewhere:

If the Iran issue were satisfactorily adjusted in the direction of the American interest, the question of Israel’s security would become more manageable overnight. If a network of American partners enjoyed security against state predation, the proactive suppression of militarily less serious threats like Islamic State would be more easily organized—and indeed, such partners would be less vulnerable to the manipulation of powers external to the region.

[The Biden administration’s] commitment to escalation avoidance has had the odd effect of making the security situation in the region look a great deal as it would if America had actually withdrawn [from the Middle East].

Alternatively, we could project competence by effectively backing our Middle East partners in their competitions against their enemies, who are also our enemies, by ensuring a favorable overall balance of power in the region by means of our partnership network, and by preventing Iran from achieving nuclear status—even if it courts escalation with Iran in the shorter run.