At a July 8 meeting of the UN Security Council, Russia vetoed a proposal for sending humanitarian aid to the beleaguered people of Syria—despite months of negotiations aimed at achieving a different result. Linda Thomas-Greenfield, the American ambassador to the UN, roundly condemned the Kremlin’s behavior, but, David Adesnik argues, Washington should have done more to prevent this predictable outcome:

Moscow did not have the support of a single other member of the Security Council—twelve backed the American position and China abstained. But still, Washington folded. Why?

The Biden administration made the critical error of negotiating without leverage. It should have built up the U.S. and allied capability to deliver aid without help from UN agencies so a Russian veto would not shut down the aid pipeline. Instead, the administration let Moscow turn millions of Syrians into hostages—the only choices available to the United States and its allies were to accept Russian demands or let civilians starve.

Moscow provided ample warning that it would pursue this ruthless strategy, but the White House did not rethink its game plan. The Russians have worked for years to choke off the supply of aid to any part of Syria outside of Assad’s control. The last enclave still receiving assistance is in the northwestern part of the country, adjacent to the Turkish border. It has an estimated 4.4 million inhabitants, including one million children. Nearly two-thirds fled their homes to escape the regime’s oppression. Some 800,000 live in tents, even in winter. Many more live in ruins.

Why, ask many Israelis, can’t we just end the war, let our children, siblings, and spouses finally come home, and get out the hostages? Azar Gat seeks to answer this question by looking at the possible costs of concluding hostilities precipitously, and breaking down some of the more specific arguments put forward by those who have despaired of continuing military operations in Gaza. He points to the case of the second intifada, in which the IDF not only ended the epidemic of suicide bombing, but effectively convinced—through application of military force—Fatah and other Palestinian factions to cease their terror war.

“What we haven’t achieved militarily in Gaza after a year-and-a-half probably can’t be achieved.” Two years passed from the outbreak of the second intifada until the launch of Operation Defensive Shield, [whose aim was] to reoccupy the West Bank, and another two years until the intifada was fully suppressed. And all of that, then as now, was conducted against the background of a mostly hostile international community and with significant American constraints (together with critical assistance) on Israeli action. The Israeli chief of staff recently estimated that the intensified Israeli military operation in the Gaza Strip would take about two months. Let’s hope that is the case.

The results of the [current] operation in [Gaza] and the breaking of Hamas’s grip on the supply routes may indeed pave the way for the entry of a non-Hamas Palestinian administration into the Strip—an arrangement that would necessarily need to be backed by Israeli bayonets, as in the West Bank. Any other end to the war will lead to Hamas’s recovery and its return to control of Gaza.

It is unclear how much Hamas was or would be willing to compromise on these figures in negotiations. But since the hostages are its primary bargaining chip, it has no incentive to compromise. On the contrary—it is interested in dragging out negotiations indefinitely, insisting on the full evacuation of the Gaza Strip and an internationally guaranteed cease-fire, to ensure its survival as Gaza’s de-facto ruler—a position that would also guarantee access to the flood of international aid destined for the Gaza Strip.

Once the hostages become the exclusive focus of discussion, Hamas dictates the rules. And since not only 251 or twenty hostages, but any number is considered worth “any price,” there is a real concern that Hamas will retain a certain number of captives as a long-term reserve.