On August 10, the federal government announced that it had charged a member of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) with trying to assassinate John Bolton, the former national security advisor, as well as another official—most likely the former secretary of state Mike Pompeo. Within the past year, Iranian agents have also twice tried to kidnap or harm the dissident activist Masih Alinejad at her Brooklyn home, while the degree of Iranian involvement in the recent attempt on Salman Rushdie’s life remains unclear. The Islamic Republic has been involved in plots of this sort on U.S. soil since 1980, as Matthew Levitt documents, but the recent ones coincide with steps toward the renewal of a nuclear deal favorable to Iran. Why would the ayatollahs want to put such a deal at risk? Levitt writes:
First, Iran sees external operations targeting its perceived enemies—be they, among others, political dissidents; regime critics; Jews; American, Israeli, European, or Gulf officials involved in activities countering Iran’s malign behaviors—as a cost-effective means of protecting the revolutionary regime in Tehran. At a time when the regime feels it is under increased pressure at home, an empowered IRGC is likely to defend the revolution aggressively.
Most significantly, the data suggest that Iran aggressively pursues international assassination, abduction, terror, and surveillance plots, even at times and in places that are particularly sensitive. With the exception of a 23-month period following the 9/11 attacks, when Iran actively sought to avoid getting caught up in the War on Terror, Iranian operatives and proxies have carried out operations even during periods of key negotiations. As illustrated by these recent plots, this includes pursuing operations—including operations here in the United States—even in the midst of negotiations over a possible return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). This was also the case during and just after the original negotiations over the original JCPOA under the Obama administration.
Iran perceives the potential benefits of such operations to be high, while the costs of getting caught are low and typically temporary. While sanctions are often imposed, they are also often later lifted. And jailed perpetrators are somewhat regularly released in prisoner exchanges. The one thing that could really impact Iran’s decision-making calculus—diplomatic isolation—has been nearly impossible to achieve given parallel efforts to negotiate a nuclear deal and concerns that Iran could retaliate with even more bellicose militant activities in the region and beyond.
Read more on Lawfare: https://www.lawfareblog.com/contending-irgc-plots