During the 1960s and 70s, writes Gil Troy, both the United Nations and the Olympics represented a hopefulness about a future very different from the bloody first half of the 20th century. The former provided a forum where nations could come together to work through their differences over a negotiating table; the latter an opportunity for people all over the world to channel rivalries through sport rather than armed conflict. For Troy, and others, that image was shattered at the 1972 Munich Olympics, where, 50 years ago this week, Palestinian terrorists murdered eleven Israeli athletes and a German policeman:

Suddenly, the Munich Olympics were defined by the Palestinian terrorists in those ghoulish stocking caps and the discordant sweatsuits, who sauntered into the Olympic village. After negotiating for hours, the Germans botched the rescue operation. . . . It was obvious to everyone I knew—mourning these young Israeli heroes, one of whom tried barricading the door with his body—that these Olympic games should end.

This tragedy offered the International Olympic Committee (IOC) an opportunity to do penance for greenlighting the infamous 1936 Hitler games. Yet, like something out of a novel, Avery Brundage, the same mean-spirited, severe-looking, anti-Semitic International Olympics Committee president who approved Hitler’s hosting then, insisted the “games must go on” in Germany 36 years later.

Remarkably, the more Palestinian terrorists terrorized innocents, the more international recognition their cause achieved. Two years later, the UN welcomed the head of the PLO. Yasir Arafat, the grandfather of modern terrorism, became the first representative of a non-member organization to address the General Assembly—sporting a holster to back up his menacing tone.

Since then, the UN has often functioned as the Third World dictators’ debating society, while sports have become increasingly politicized.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.