In the past few decades, Israel has undergone a diplomatic revolution, in part by using its newfound status as an engine of technological innovation, reversing many years of isolation and hostility. These achievements can in many ways be chalked up to what political scientists call “soft power.” But Israel has always known that soft power can supplement, but not replace, the state’s capacity to defend itself from terrorism and military aggression, and to project its own deterrent force. The rest of the world is again learning to appreciate the irreplaceable necessities of “hard power.” Rich Lowry writes:

After the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky had bucketfuls of soft power. He was the most admired man in the world. He spoke at the United Nations, to Congress and other national legislative bodies, and even at the Grammys. What did that get him? It helped solidify the good will of Western countries, which was essential. He constantly tried to leverage that sentiment, though, for the hardheaded priority of more weapons.

Zelensky could still be admired in death, or in a Russian prison, or as an exile. Yet, if he wanted to continue to be admired as the leader of an independent country, he needed sheer firepower. Ukraine’s cause hasn’t gotten any more just or inspiring over the last couple of months; it’s gotten better armed.

The United States is a marvel of soft power, binding allies to us, attracting people all over the world who want to come here, and reaching the most far-flung places in the world. What we’ve been able to provide Ukraine that has been most telling, though, hasn’t been diplomatic or moral support, rather a system that can put a rocket directly on a target up to 50 miles away.

That’s been the game changer, as better military technology has always been, from long bows to arquebuses, from muskets to fighter jets. There is simply no substitute for hard power.

Between the explosion of thousands of Hizballah pagers on September 17 and now, Iran’s geopolitical clout has shrunk dramatically: Hizballah, Iran’s most important striking force, has retreated to lick its wounds; Iranian influence in Syria has collapsed; Iran’s attempts to attack Israel via Gaza have proved self-defeating; its missile and drone arsenal have proved impotent; and its territorial defenses have proved useless in the face of Israeli airpower. Edward Luttwak considers what might happen next:

The myth of Iranian power was ironically propagated by the United States itself. Right at the start of his first term, in January 2009, Barack Obama was terrified that he would be maneuvered into fighting a war against Iran. . . . Obama started his tenure by apologizing for America’s erstwhile support for the shah. And beyond showing contrition for the past, the then-president also set a new rule, one that lasted all the way to October 2024: Iran may attack anyone, but none may attack Iran.

[Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s] variegated fighters, in light trucks and jeeps, could have been stopped by a few hundred well-trained soldiers. But neither Hizballah nor Iran’s own Revolutionary Guards could react. Hizballah no longer has any large units capable of crossing the border to fight rebels in Syria, as they had done so many times before. As for the Revolutionary Guards, they were commandeering civilian airliners to fly troops into Damascus airport to support Assad. But then Israel made clear that it would not allow Iran’s troops so close to its border, and Iran no longer had credible counter-threats.

Now Iran’s population is discovering that it has spent decades in poverty to pay for the massive build-up of the Revolutionary Guards and all their militias. And for what? They have elaborate bases and showy headquarters, but their expensive ballistic missiles can only be used against defenseless Arabs, not Israel with its Arrow interceptors. As for Hizballah, clearly it cannot even defend itself, let alone Iran’s remaining allies in the region. Perhaps, in short, the dictatorship will finally be challenged in the streets of Iran’s cities, at scale and in earnest.