Following the Kremlin’s recent announcement that it is shutting off the Nord Stream 1 pipeline, Europe faces a sharp increase in already-high energy prices. One possible way to ameliorate the situation not just for Europe but for the rest of the globe would be to lift sanctions on Venezuelan and Iranian oil. In the latter case, the renewed nuclear deal currently under negotiation would accomplish just that. But Oved Lobel argues that such efforts would be counterproductive:

Much of Venezuela’s energy industry has come under virtual Russian control over the decade, not only via Russia’s partnership with Cuba—which siphoned off [Venezuelan] oil in the late 1990s in partnership with Iran—but also through direct loans in exchange for oil and ownership interest in Venezuelan energy projects. Russia’s state-owned Rosneft and its boss, Igor Sechin, perhaps the second-most powerful man in Russia, almost singlehandedly kept the Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro’s regime afloat, while Sechin himself regularly meets with Maduro and had a close relationship with his predecessor, Hugo Chavez.

Russia and Iran, meanwhile, have always had a sanctions-evading relationship, one set to deepen if the nuclear deal is revived. . . . Regardless of whether the reported $40 billion energy deal between Russia and Iran actually results in anything concrete, the two countries will continue to cooperate as much as compete in the energy sphere. In May, for instance, a Russian-flagged and -operated tanker carrying Iranian oil was seized by the U.S. off of Greece, although Iran then hijacked two Greek tankers in retaliation and Greece ultimately released the oil back to Iran.

What seems like realpolitik is therefore counterproductive. There is simply no way to compartmentalize these countries; the energy networks are too intertwined. Easing pressure on any of them will result in empowering all of them.

Surveying news websites and social media on Sunday morning, I immediately found some intelligent and well-informed observers arguing that Iran deliberately warned the U.S. of its pending assault on Israel, and calibrated it so that there would be few casualties and minimal destructiveness, thus hoping to avoid major retaliation. In other words, this massive barrage was a face-saving gesture by the ayatollahs. Others disagreed. Brian Carter and Frederick W. Kagan put the issue to rest:

The Iranian April 13 missile-drone attack on Israel was very likely intended to cause significant damage below the threshold that would trigger a massive Israeli response. The attack was designed to succeed, not to fail. The strike package was modeled on those the Russians have used repeatedly against Ukraine to great effect. The attack caused more limited damage than intended likely because the Iranians underestimated the tremendous advantages Israel has in defending against such strikes compared with Ukraine.

But that isn’t to say that Tehran achieved nothing:

The lessons that Iran will draw from this attack will allow it to build more successful strike packages in the future. The attack probably helped Iran identify the relative strengths and weaknesses of the Israeli air-defense system. Iran will likely also share the lessons it learned in this attack with Russia.

Iran’s ability to penetrate Israeli air defenses with even a small number of large ballistic missiles presents serious security concerns for Israel. The only Iranian missiles that got through hit an Israeli military base, limiting the damage, but a future strike in which several ballistic missiles penetrate Israeli air defenses and hit Tel Aviv or Haifa could cause significant civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure, including ports and energy. . . . Israel and its partners should not emerge from this successful defense with any sense of complacency.