While Confronting Russia in Europe, the U.S. Helps It in the Middle East

Sept. 14 2022

Since Moscow launched its all-out assault on Ukraine in February, Washington has vocally condemned the invasion, imposed sanctions, sent arms and other aid to Ukraine, and generally made pushing back against Vladimir Putin a strategic objective. Yet, Michael Doran explains, America’s efforts to reinstate the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran, along with its longstanding policies in Syria, only benefit the Kremlin:

It is in Syria that this contradictory approach will do the most harm. Although Russian-Iranian relations there are not perfectly harmonious, Moscow and Tehran do share a fundamental commitment to save the Assad regime and have been cooperating closely for years to achieve that aim. The hundreds of billions of dollars that the nuclear deal will channel to the Iranian regime . . . cannot but help them strengthen Assad’s grip on power.

For the United States to advance the Russian-Iranian joint project is even more striking because Syria and Ukraine are umbilically linked. In October 2015, the U.S. Navy’s top commander in Europe, Admiral Mark Ferguson, tried to raise awareness of this fact in Washington. As the Russians began their campaign to shore up Assad, Ferguson referred publicly to an “arc of steel,” by which he meant a network of new bastions of Russian naval power. The hottest segment of the arc, at that moment, was the naval bridge, stretching between the port of Sevastopol in Russian-occupied Crimea and the port of Tartus on Syria’s coast, that supplied the Russian-Iranian campaign to save Assad. But before long Putin was also using Syria as a base for extending the arc deep into the Mediterranean. In 2020, for example, Russia flew more than a dozen attack jets from Syria to Libya to support Russian forces aiding the warlord Khalifa Haftar in his effort to seize Tripoli, the capital.

In short, without the naval bridge between Sevastopol and Tartus, Russia’s capacity to project power into the Mediterranean would be circumscribed. Ukraine’s aspirations to retake Crimea, therefore, threaten Russia’s status as a Middle Eastern power—yet one more reason why Putin seeks to turn Ukraine into a satrapy of Russia. Even if Kyiv were to cede Sevastopol to Russia permanently, the rise of a fully independent Ukraine would still worry Moscow, which fears that Ukraine might build a serious navy, or might acquire surface-to-ship missile batteries and unmanned aerial vehicles capable of threatening the Russian Black Sea fleet.

Read more at Caravan

More about: Iran nuclear deal, Russia, Syrian civil war, U.S. Foreign policy, War in Ukraine

Israel’s Qatar Dilemma, and How It Can Be Solved

March 26 2025

Small in area and population and rich in natural gas, Qatar plays an outsize role in the Middle East. While its support keeps Hamas in business, it also has vital relations with Israel that are much better than those enjoyed by many other Arab countries. Doha’s relationship with Washington, though more complex, isn’t so different. Yoel Guzansky offers a comprehensive examination of Israel’s Qatar dilemma:

At first glance, Qatar’s foreign policy seems filled with contradictions. Since 1995, it has pursued a strategy of diplomatic hedging—building relationships with multiple, often competing, actors. Qatar’s vast wealth and close ties with the United States have enabled it to maneuver independently on the international stage, maintaining relations with rival factions, including those that are direct adversaries.

Qatar plays an active role in international diplomacy, engaging in conflict mediation in over twenty regions worldwide. While not all of its mediation efforts have been successful, they have helped boost its international prestige, which it considers vital for its survival among larger and more powerful neighbors. Qatar has participated in mediation efforts in Venezuela, Lebanon, Iran, Afghanistan, and other conflict zones, reinforcing its image as a neutral broker.

Israel’s stated objective of removing Hamas from power in Gaza is fundamentally at odds with Qatar’s interest in keeping Hamas as the governing force. In theory, if the Israeli hostages would to be released, Israel could break free from its dependence on Qatari mediation. However, it is likely that even after such a development, Qatar will continue positioning itself as a mediator—particularly in enforcing agreements and shaping Gaza’s reconstruction efforts.

Qatar’s position is strengthened further by its good relations with the U.S. Yet, Guzansky notes, it has weaknesses as well that Israel could exploit:

Qatar is highly sensitive to its global image and prides itself on maintaining a neutral diplomatic posture. If Israel chooses to undermine Qatar’s reputation, it could target specific aspects of Qatari activity that are problematic from an Israeli perspective.

Read more at Institute for National Security Studies

More about: Hamas, Israel diplomacy, Qatar, U.S. Foreign policy