Since driving Islamic State (IS) from its territorial strongholds in Syria, a contingent of American forces has remained in the country. Thanks to their presence, Russian, Iranian, and Syrian-government forces have been kept out of the entire swath of the country east of the Euphrates River. James Jeffrey explains the value of keeping this contingent in place:

The core result of [a U.S. withdrawal] would be to give the Russians greater diplomatic and military bandwidth to increase their pressure on Turkey and Israel to withdraw from Syria as well. That would eventually leave all of Syria under the control of Bashar al-Assad, who instigated the war, and hand Russia and Iran a strategic victory. The United States would be transforming a relatively effective in-country operation that has just 900 soldiers—none of whom have been killed in almost four years—into an offshore effort against IS, presumably in coordination with the tyrant responsible for 650,000 deaths and the displacement of half his country’s population.

Assad’s efforts against IS are feckless. Moreover, military leaders at U.S. Central Command have publicly stressed the need for a U.S. footprint in Syria, not out-of-country bases, to suppress IS. Yes, . . . Iranian-backed militias attack U.S. positions in Syria—just as they do in Iraq and elsewhere in the region. But retreat encourages, rather than deters, Tehran.

The relative success of [the current American] strategy has only become more evident in the past four years, as the ceasefires have held and several attempts by Arab states to reduce Assad’s isolation have garnered no real response from Damascus. More importantly, in an era of increasing geostrategic competition, including with Russia and Iran, the United States must avoid giving away unnecessary strategic victories. The Syrian freeze might not be pretty, but it is likely what limited victory will look like going forward in Syria and perhaps elsewhere.

In a momentous meeting with the Syrian president Ahmed al-Sharaa in Riyadh, President Trump announced that he is lifting sanctions on the beleaguered and war-torn country. On the one hand, Sharaa is an alumnus of Islamic State and al-Qaeda, who came to power as commander of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which itself began life as al-Qaeda’s Syrian offshoot; he also seems to enjoy the support of Qatar. On the other hand, he overthrew the Assad regime—a feat made possible by the battering Israel delivered to Hizballah—greatly improving Jerusalem’s strategic position, and ending one of the world’s most atrocious and brutal tyrannies. President Trump also announced that he hopes Syria will join the Abraham Accords.

This analysis by Eran Lerman was published a few days ago, and in some respects is already out of date, but more than anything else I’ve read it helps to make sense of Israel’s strategic position vis-à-vis Syria.

Israel’s primary security interest lies in defending against worst-case scenarios, particularly the potential collapse of the Syrian state or its transformation into an actively hostile force backed by a significant Turkish presence (considering that the Turkish military is the second largest in NATO) with all that this would imply. Hence the need to bolster the new buffer zone—not for territorial gain, but as a vital shield and guarantee against dangerous developments. Continued airstrikes aimed at diminishing the residual components of strategic military capabilities inherited from the Assad regime are essential.

At the same time, there is a need to create conditions that would enable those in Damascus who wish to reject the reduction of their once-proud country into a Turkish satrapy. Sharaa’s efforts to establish his legitimacy, including his visit to Paris and outreach to the U.S., other European nations, and key Gulf countries, may generate positive leverage in this regard. Israel’s role is to demonstrate through daily actions the severe costs of acceding to Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s ambitions and accepting Turkish hegemony.

Israel should also assist those in Syria (and beyond: this may have an effect in Lebanon as well) who look to it as a strategic anchor in the region. The Druze in Syria—backed by their brethren in Israel—have openly expressed this expectation, breaking decades of loyalty to the central power in Damascus over their obligation to their kith and kin.