Historically, Beijing has sought to pursue a strategy of neutrality when it comes to the Middle East, which in recent years has meant forging relationships with Iran, Israel, and the Gulf States—irrespective of the differences dividing these countries. But some have understood Xi Jinping’s visit to Saudi Arabia last month, where he met with representatives of other Gulf states, as a signal that he is trying to bring his country closer to Riyadh and its allies, and further from the Saudi rival Tehran. Tuvia Gering rejects this suggestion:

China believes Tehran has enormous potential, which it intends to harness in due course. With 85 million highly educated citizens and a strategic location on the Persian Gulf at the crossroads of the Arab, Turkish, Russian, and Indian dominions, this country is an ideal candidate for Belt and Road construction projects and investments, [as Beijing calls its massive plans for a transcontinental infrastructure network]. And while China is the world’s largest energy consumer, Iran has some of the world’s largest proven oil and gas reserves.

Although the ostensibly secular Communist party-state surely finds Iran’s Islamic fundamentalism unsavory, it is a potent regional force in the struggle against American hegemony. . . . The notion that China is displeased with Iran’s active participation in Russia’s war in Ukraine because of its supply of drones and missiles, as some have suggested, is puzzling. Xi Jinping is a man who can look Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin straight in the eye and say unironically that “China stands ready to join hands with Russia and all other progressive forces around the world” to “uphold international fairness and justice.”

Worse, China has been providing an economic lifeline to the ayatollahs’ regime. Since President Joe Biden took office, China has purchased no less than $47 billion worth of oil from Iran, in both overt and covert resistance to the U.S.-led sanctions regime. Speak nothing of the techno-authoritarian tools it supplies Tehran to oppress its captive population, its outright support to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and the laundering of its money.

Surveying news websites and social media on Sunday morning, I immediately found some intelligent and well-informed observers arguing that Iran deliberately warned the U.S. of its pending assault on Israel, and calibrated it so that there would be few casualties and minimal destructiveness, thus hoping to avoid major retaliation. In other words, this massive barrage was a face-saving gesture by the ayatollahs. Others disagreed. Brian Carter and Frederick W. Kagan put the issue to rest:

The Iranian April 13 missile-drone attack on Israel was very likely intended to cause significant damage below the threshold that would trigger a massive Israeli response. The attack was designed to succeed, not to fail. The strike package was modeled on those the Russians have used repeatedly against Ukraine to great effect. The attack caused more limited damage than intended likely because the Iranians underestimated the tremendous advantages Israel has in defending against such strikes compared with Ukraine.

But that isn’t to say that Tehran achieved nothing:

The lessons that Iran will draw from this attack will allow it to build more successful strike packages in the future. The attack probably helped Iran identify the relative strengths and weaknesses of the Israeli air-defense system. Iran will likely also share the lessons it learned in this attack with Russia.

Iran’s ability to penetrate Israeli air defenses with even a small number of large ballistic missiles presents serious security concerns for Israel. The only Iranian missiles that got through hit an Israeli military base, limiting the damage, but a future strike in which several ballistic missiles penetrate Israeli air defenses and hit Tel Aviv or Haifa could cause significant civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure, including ports and energy. . . . Israel and its partners should not emerge from this successful defense with any sense of complacency.