Since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, Tehran has been managing a network of militias inside Iraq, which in 2014 were formally organized into the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). As the Islamic Republic has tightened its grip on Baghdad, these militias—responsible for the deaths of hundreds of U.S. troops, countless massacres of Iraqis, and the suppression of protests in 2020—have come to play a role in the Iraqi government and often work alongside the country’s military. The recent earthquake along the Turkish-Syrian border, explains Erik Yavorsky, has now enabled them to team-up with their fellow Iranian proxies in Syria:

Previously, if PMF forces were in Syria, they were doing so without legal orders from Iraq’s commander-in-chief, as required by Iraqi constitution, the chain of command, and the military code of discipline. The earthquake has opened up a significant opportunity for the PMF to work openly in Syria and for Iran to transport weapons to Syria and Lebanon inside aid convoys.

The PMF, which is led by the U.S.-designated human-rights abuser Falah al-Fayyadh and the U.S.-designated terrorist Abdul Aziz al-Muhammadawi (Abu Fadak), quickly established a humanitarian-aid campaign for Syria. . . . The assistance operations are undertaken by Abu Fadak, who was dispatched to Syria to . . . oversee the aid effort. On the Iraqi side of the border, the convoys are facilitated by Qasem Muslih, the PMF’s head of operations in Anbar, who in 2021 was arrested by Iraqi officials in connection to the 2020 murder of an activist. . . . On February 16, . . . Falah al-Fayyadh, met with Bashar al-Assad, [a loyal ally of Iran], in person.

While some rank-and-file PMF members undoubtedly have genuine empathy for the Syrian population and are delivering aid of real value, the [pro-Iranian] leadership of the PMF—comprising U.S.-designated human-rights abusers and terrorists—and their Iranian partners are likely to use the earthquake to improve substantially their cross-border coordination with Assad and Lebanese Hizballah, and to legitimize themselves inside Iraq.

The result is the further advancement of Iran’s plan to create a contiguous sphere of influence that stretches westward to the Mediterranean, and abuts Israel’s northern border. In practical terms, Iraq-Syria coordination makes it easer for Tehran to position advanced weaponry aimed at the Jewish state in Syria and Lebanon.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.