In the wake of the July 7, 2005 London terrorist attacks, the United Kingdom developed Prevent, a set of programs that aim to discourage young people from joining “extremist” groups and to “deradicalize” those already in their clutches. Recently, William Shawross published his findings after conducting an extensive independent review of the program at the government’s behest. He found numerous troubling patterns, including a disproportionate and wrongheaded focus on right-wing extremists, with the result that reading the works of John Locke or C.S. Lewis is taken as a sign of incipient white supremacism, but reading the works of Sayid Qutb—founder of Islamism and the Muslim Brotherhood—is not considered a sign of anything. Then there is the problem that Prevent gives money to Islamist preachers and organizations in the hope that they will exert a moderating influence.

Kyle Orton comments on Shawcross’s findings:

First, and in the most direct sense, there are signs of deep confusion about what Islamism is, which is perhaps not that surprising when the use of the very word is still being contested. . . . Prevent’s tendency has been to secularize jihadists, [which] means that instead of experts on jihadist ideology, the program “frequently seeks guidance from academics or psychologists with a clinical or theoretical background.” . . . It has been a popular understanding in such circles that extremism is like a virus people can catch by watching the wrong YouTube video.

Some of the most severe problems are specific to Channel, a division of Prevent that intervenes with people flagged by the program’s other branches:

Shawcross found an extraordinary prevalence of anti-Semitism in the Channel system. Anti-Semitism “spanned across the full range of Channel cases we observed, regardless of the nature of the ideology. . . . [Anti-Semitism] unites both Islamists and [the] extreme right wing, as well as the extreme left, in a kind of modern-day Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact,” Shawcross writes. Individuals not only openly expressed their belief in anti-Semitic, Protocols of the Elders of Zion-type conspiracy theories, but their wish to blow up synagogues, admitted to having done hostile surveillance to enable same, and their desire to do violence against Jewish people, either collectively or individually.

Shawcross does not point this out, but the scale of the targeting of British Jews in hate crimes is staggering: seven times the rate of attacks on Muslims, and nearly one-quarter of all hate crimes, despite [Jews] being less than 0.5 percent of the population.

Small in area and population and rich in natural gas, Qatar plays an outsize role in the Middle East. While its support keeps Hamas in business, it also has vital relations with Israel that are much better than those enjoyed by many other Arab countries. Doha’s relationship with Washington, though more complex, isn’t so different. Yoel Guzansky offers a comprehensive examination of Israel’s Qatar dilemma:

At first glance, Qatar’s foreign policy seems filled with contradictions. Since 1995, it has pursued a strategy of diplomatic hedging—building relationships with multiple, often competing, actors. Qatar’s vast wealth and close ties with the United States have enabled it to maneuver independently on the international stage, maintaining relations with rival factions, including those that are direct adversaries.

Qatar plays an active role in international diplomacy, engaging in conflict mediation in over twenty regions worldwide. While not all of its mediation efforts have been successful, they have helped boost its international prestige, which it considers vital for its survival among larger and more powerful neighbors. Qatar has participated in mediation efforts in Venezuela, Lebanon, Iran, Afghanistan, and other conflict zones, reinforcing its image as a neutral broker.

Israel’s stated objective of removing Hamas from power in Gaza is fundamentally at odds with Qatar’s interest in keeping Hamas as the governing force. In theory, if the Israeli hostages would to be released, Israel could break free from its dependence on Qatari mediation. However, it is likely that even after such a development, Qatar will continue positioning itself as a mediator—particularly in enforcing agreements and shaping Gaza’s reconstruction efforts.

Qatar’s position is strengthened further by its good relations with the U.S. Yet, Guzansky notes, it has weaknesses as well that Israel could exploit:

Qatar is highly sensitive to its global image and prides itself on maintaining a neutral diplomatic posture. If Israel chooses to undermine Qatar’s reputation, it could target specific aspects of Qatari activity that are problematic from an Israeli perspective.