Beginning with his 2020 electoral campaign, Joe Biden and his foreign-policy team have argued for coming to an accommodation with Tehran over its nuclear program. Biden summed up his approach in an essay he wrote two months before the election, in which he asserted, “There’s a smarter way to be tough on Iran” than then-President Trump’s supposed bellicosity. Yet, argues Michael Doran, there seems to be little evidence that the current president’s approach is capable of achieving results:

Since [President Biden] took office, Tehran moved closer to developing a nuclear weapon by, among other steps, routinely enriching uranium to 60 percent and operating advanced centrifuges. As a wave of unprecedented protests swept Iran, Tehran supplied killer drones to Russia, thus becoming an indirect threat to the eastern flank of the European alliance. Meanwhile, it continued its policies of periodically attacking American and allied forces stationed throughout the Arab world and of planning terror attacks abroad, including plots to kill former American officials on American soil.

Political pressure, according to Doran, explains in part why the White House has nonetheless stuck to its original approach. But it’s not the only reason:

Iran is also deterring Biden. In response to a more aggressive American policy, Tehran might begin enriching uranium to 90 percent and race toward a nuclear weapon. If Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei were to give the order tomorrow, Iran could produce highly enriched uranium to build four nuclear weapons within about one month. It could explode a nuclear device underground within approximately six months. Only American military action could deter such moves.

Dubious assumptions about China also breathe life into “the smarter way.” Biden and his team came into office believing that Beijing (not to mention Moscow) could help stabilize the Middle East. . . . . The administration assumed then, and no doubt still assumes, that it could work together with China and Russia to remove the Middle East from the worst aspects of great-power competition. A flexible and lithe American policy will supposedly prevent a new cold war from enveloping the region.

“The smarter way” is the self-delusion that allows the American strategic community to have it both ways: to believe that it can compete with China globally and pull back from the Middle East simultaneously. It is the public face of a series of unconscious, “if only” wishes about how pretty life might be without its most unpleasant aspects. Wouldn’t it be pretty, if only the United States could downgrade the Middle East and focus its attention on Asia instead? If only Beijing and Moscow would agree not to make a play for control of the global energy market? If only Iran had no intentions to oust the United States from the Arabian Gulf, destroy Israel, and dominate Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates?

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.