Last week, the news website Axios reported that U.S. officials had spoken to allied governments about the possibility of restoring a limited version of the suspended 2015 nuclear deal with the Islamic Republic. Such an arrangement would exchange a slowdown of the Iranian nuclear program for a partial reduction in sanctions—a far cry from the “longer and stronger” deal previously promised by the Biden administration. Jacob Nagel comments:

The [proposal] is not a preparation for a broader, longer, and better deal, as its supporters (both American and Israeli claim), because this will be the last deal. Tehran will ostensibly agree to a few concessions and will receive many benefits in return. This was true a few years ago and is even more so now, in light of the changes since then. The deal would legitimize most of Iran’s violations and will allow Iran to retain assets obtained through breaching [its previous commitments].

Once the Iranians will get significant concessions, a bigger, broader follow-up deal is only an illusion.

The Iranians realize that Washington does not want to respond, despite all their nuclear violations, attacks on American interests in the Gulf and in the Middle East, human-rights violations, and killing of women and girls in Iran—including perhaps with chemical weapons as recently reported—as well as massive support for Russia in the Ukraine war, including transferring weapons to the Russians and helping them to kill Ukrainian women and children. If the Americans don’t respond to all those violations and even offer the Iranians a partial deal, why would the regime agree to any further restrictions on nuclear and missile programs, when it got almost everything it wanted from the small deal while the American president refuses to put a credible military threat on the table?

Considering the current state of Israel-Arab relations, Ghaith al-Omari writes

First and foremost, no ceasefire will be possible without the release of Israeli hostages and commitments to disarm Hamas and remove it from power. The final say on these matters rests with Hamas commanders on the ground in Gaza, who have been largely impervious to foreign pressure so far. At minimum, however, the United States should insist that Qatari and Egyptian mediators push Hamas’s external leadership to accept these conditions publicly, which could increase pressure on the group’s Gaza leadership.

Washington should also demand a clear, public position from key Arab states regarding disarmament. The Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas endorsed this position in a June letter to Saudi Arabia and France, giving Arab states Palestinian cover for endorsing it themselves.

Some Arab states have already indicated a willingness to play a significant role, but they will have little incentive to commit resources and personnel to Gaza unless Israel (1) provides guarantees that it will not occupy the Strip indefinitely, and (2) removes its veto on a PA role in Gaza’s future, even if only symbolic at first. Arab officials are also seeking assurances that any role they play in Gaza will be in the context of a wider effort to reach a two-state solution.

On the other hand, Washington must remain mindful that current conditions between Israel and the Palestinians are not remotely conducive to . . . implementing a two-state solution.