While most of Tunisia’s Jews left the country during the 1950s and 60s, roughly 1,000 remain on the island of Djerba, which boasts a historic synagogue and a community with its own traditions, living under the protection of the government. The synagogue continues to attract a large wave of pilgrims from abroad on the holiday of Lag ba’Omer, which this year fell last Tuesday. A member of the Tunisian national guard chose the festive occasion to open fire on a crowd outside the synagogue, killing two Jews and three security personnel. Ben Cohen examines how the country’s regime has responded:

A member of the Tunisian Jewish community expressed serious concern regarding the remarks delivered by President Kais Saied to Tunisia’s National Security Council on Wednesday, pointing to the absence of any condemnation of anti-Semitism or condolences specifically directed to the Jewish community. “I heard his entire speech, and I realized that it is probably very difficult for him to mention the word ‘Jews’,” the Jewish community member—who spoke on condition of strict anonymity for fear of reprisals—told the Algemeiner during a telephone interview on Thursday.

“Without a doubt, [Saied] is not only a hater of Israel but also anti-Semitic,” the person added emphatically.

Saied has caused consternation among Tunisian Jews in the recent past, having been taken to task by Jewish organizations in 2021 after he delivered a speech in which he accused Jews of being responsible “for the instability in the country”—an assertion the Tunisian leader later denied making.

Saied’s comments were echoed by other Tunisian political leaders. A statement from the heads of the Tunisian Labor Union (UGGT) condemned the “vile terrorist operation” in Djerba before denouncing “the instrumentalization by the media and foreign circles, by wrongly identifying this heinous terrorist crime with what is called ‘anti-Semitism,’ with a view to smearing Tunisia.”

For more than a year, the Iran-backed Houthis have been launching drones and missiles at ships traversing the Red Sea, as well as at Israeli territory, in support of Hamas. This development has drastically curtailed shipping through the Suez Canal and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, driving up trade prices. This week, the Trump administration began an extensive bombing campaign against the Houthis in an effort to reopen that crucial waterway. Burcu Ozcelik highlights another benefit of this action:

The administration has a broader geopolitical agenda—one that includes countering China’s economic leverage, particularly Beijing’s reliance on Iranian oil. By targeting the Houthis, the United States is not only safeguarding vital shipping lanes but also exerting pressure on the Iran-China energy nexus, a key component of Beijing’s strategic posture in the region.

China was the primary destination for up to 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports in 2024, underscoring the deepening economic ties between Beijing and Tehran despite U.S. sanctions. By helping fill Iranian coffers, China aids Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in financing proxies like the Houthis. Since October of last year, notable U.S. Treasury announcements have revealed covert links between China and the Houthis.

Striking the Houthis could trigger broader repercussions—not least by disrupting the flow of Iranian oil to China. While difficult to confirm, it is conceivable and has been reported, that the Houthis may have received financial or other forms of compensation from China (such as Chinese-made military components) in exchange for allowing freedom of passage for China-affiliated vessels in the Red Sea.