Following decreased American support and China-brokered détente with Iran, Saudi Arabia appears to ready to give up on its war against the Tehran-backed Houthi militia in Yemen. To this end, the Saudi ambassador to the country met with a Houthi leader last month. Oved Lobel ponders what will become of Yemen if Riyadh and its Arab allies decide to abandon it to Iranian proxies:

Much like the U.S. in its engagement with the Taliban, the Saudis have sidelined the Yemeni government and other Yemeni actors and are negotiating their withdrawal directly with the Houthis and [Tehran]. Among the range of possible outcomes, all bad, the least bad would be if the conflict were to be frozen indefinitely, with Saudi Arabia remaining militarily engaged to protect Marib and other areas loyal to the Yemeni government, and the Houthis inevitably launching missile and drone strikes but no new offensives to conquer territory.

But the most likely outcome, as in Afghanistan, is total Saudi disengagement from Yemen. . . . If the Saudis do unilaterally withdraw support for allies in Yemen, there are three potential scenarios for Yemen: Hizballah-ization, in which [Iran] pragmatically moves its local arm into politics—while retaining separate security forces and ultimate control—within the façade of a state; partition, in which the Houthis quickly conquer all areas held by the Yemeni government but at least temporarily do not attempt to conquer areas controlled by the United Arab Emirates’ proxies in the South; and Talibanization, in which the Houthis move to conquer the entire country immediately.

[W]hat is not in doubt . . . is that, for both Houthi leaders and their Iranian commanders, jihad is non-negotiable—particularly after they have begun to taste victory.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.