As the United Kingdom prepares for its next election, the Labor leader (and likely next prime minister) Keir Starmer released a campaign video in which he talks at length about the problem of Islamophobia, and alludes to using the legal system to combat it. Meanwhile, in the U.S., politicians and public institutions have gotten themselves in the habit of responding to every outburst of hostility to Jews with condemnations of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. Ed Husain argues that these two things are not alike:

Islamophobia is a fear of ideas, beliefs, and attitudes. Violence or discrimination against adherents of any religion is obviously indefensible, but it should also go without saying that in a free society people should be at liberty to criticize or mock any organized religion. No intelligent Muslim should place the word “Islam” and the word “phobia” together in a single phrase. This is why the word did not exist until relatively recently. [The term] Islamophobia has been largely promoted by Islamists and jihadists, to protect them from scrutiny.

Legislating against “Islamophobia” would have disastrous consequences. The German judge who refused to grant a Muslim woman a divorce from her abusive husband in 2007 did so on the grounds that the abuse was culturally acceptable and sanctioned by the Quran. Such incidents would become normal for fear of accusations of “Islamophobia.” Let’s remember that the i-word has been used not only against politicians but also against Muslims who confront jihadists.

Ron Ben-Yishai, reporting from a visit to IDF forces in the Gaza Strip, analyzes the state of the fighting, and “the persistent challenge of eradicating an entrenched enemy in a complex urban terrain.”

Hamas, sensing the war’s end, is mounting a final effort to inflict casualties. The IDF now controls 65 percent of Gaza’s territory operationally, with observation, fire dominance, and relative freedom of movement, alongside systematic tunnel destruction. . . . Major P, a reserve company commander, says, “It’s frustrating to hear at home that we’re stagnating. The public doesn’t get that if we stop, Hamas will recover.”

Senior IDF officers cite two reasons for the slow progress: meticulous care to protect hostages, requiring cautious movement and constant intelligence gathering, and avoiding heavy losses, with 22 soldiers killed since June.

Two-and-a-half of Hamas’s five brigades have been dismantled, yet a new hostage deal and IDF withdrawal could allow Hamas to regroup. . . . Hamas is at its lowest military and governing point since its founding, reduced to a fragmented guerrilla force. Yet, without complete disarmament and infrastructure destruction, it could resurge as a threat in years.

At the same time, Ben-Yishai observes, not everything hangs on the IDF:

According to the Southern Command chief Major General Yaron Finkelman, the IDF is close to completing its objectives. In classical military terms, “defeat” means the enemy surrenders—but with a jihadist organization, the benchmark is its ability to operate against Israel.

Despite [the IDF’s] battlefield successes, the broader strategic outcome—especially regarding the hostages—now hinges on decisions from the political leadership. “We’ve done our part,” said a senior officer. “We’ve reached a crossroads where the government must decide where it wants to go—both on the hostage issue and on Gaza’s future.”