As anticipated, the British national election on Thursday ended with a landslide victory for Labor, which regained some of the Jewish voters it had lost when it was led by the Israel-hating radical Jeremy Corbyn. Jake Wallis Simons is somewhat skeptical about the efforts of Corbyn’s successor, now-Prime Minister Keir Starmer, to purge Labor of anti-Semites:

Just five years ago, it was a party of cranks, extremists, bigots, and anti-Semites. Just five years ago, Sir Keir appeared to do his utmost to put their chieftain, [Corbyn], in No. 10 Downing Street. Could the country trust him and his party now?

The answer, for many, seems to be “yes,” and Simons, despite his skepticism, argues that there is good reason for that:

Partly, [the Jewish return to Labor] was due to the determined efforts of Sir Keir himself in “rooting out” anti-Semitism from the party. Partly it was due to the way in which he steered Labor carefully but insistently back towards the center; when parties veer to the radical fringes, it is never good for the Jews. But it was also due to the Labor rank-and-file, who matched Sir Keir’s efforts with more quotidian goodwill gestures of their own.

It would be a mistake to suggest that all the difficult questions about Sir Keir’s support for Corbyn have been adequately addressed. In politics, some things will never be fully understood. It is certain, however, that the majority of British Jews, particularly those inclined to the left, believe in Labor again. They have Sir Keir to thank for that.

For more than a year, the Iran-backed Houthis have been launching drones and missiles at ships traversing the Red Sea, as well as at Israeli territory, in support of Hamas. This development has drastically curtailed shipping through the Suez Canal and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, driving up trade prices. This week, the Trump administration began an extensive bombing campaign against the Houthis in an effort to reopen that crucial waterway. Burcu Ozcelik highlights another benefit of this action:

The administration has a broader geopolitical agenda—one that includes countering China’s economic leverage, particularly Beijing’s reliance on Iranian oil. By targeting the Houthis, the United States is not only safeguarding vital shipping lanes but also exerting pressure on the Iran-China energy nexus, a key component of Beijing’s strategic posture in the region.

China was the primary destination for up to 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports in 2024, underscoring the deepening economic ties between Beijing and Tehran despite U.S. sanctions. By helping fill Iranian coffers, China aids Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in financing proxies like the Houthis. Since October of last year, notable U.S. Treasury announcements have revealed covert links between China and the Houthis.

Striking the Houthis could trigger broader repercussions—not least by disrupting the flow of Iranian oil to China. While difficult to confirm, it is conceivable and has been reported, that the Houthis may have received financial or other forms of compensation from China (such as Chinese-made military components) in exchange for allowing freedom of passage for China-affiliated vessels in the Red Sea.